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Abstract
The thesis sets out to explore the gender-implications of the eros-concept 
elaborated in Diotima’s Symposium speech. While seeking the possibilities of 
interpreting Diotima’s teaching, the paper also presents an interpretation of my 
own. I propose that Alcibiades’ speech may serve as a prism that highlights the 
Dionysiac side of Diotima’s eros. The project is realized in an interdisciplinary 
manner. The philosophy of sexual difference, modem hermeneutics, as well as 
methods from literary theory and classical philology are employed.
The feminist endeavor of re-reading the philosophical canon has brought 
about several interpretations of the Symposium, which often seem methodologically 
incompatible with one another. One of the main arguments of the thesis is that 
these clashing approaches may be reconciled via Gadamer’s model of dialogue and 
a joint use of their methodologies may be achieved through applying Wolfgang 
Iser’s theory of interpretation. The first part of the thesis problematizes these 
theoretical issues through a comparative analysis of two feminist readings of 
Diotima’s speech, those of Luce Irigaray and Andrea Nye.
The second part investigates the gender-aspects of Diotima’s speech. An 
analysis of Alcibiades’ speech shows how the Dionysiac plays an important role in 
understanding Diotima’s eros and in unfolding its gender implications via the 
philosophy of sexual difference. The notion of sexual difference enables the analyst 
to recognize Diotima as a male constmct of a female image that Plato creates in 
order to appropriate the female experience of birth to his philosophy. The problem 
areas dealt with in this section are the mimetic male desire for female experience, 
immortality, and the figure of the birth-giving male. Alongside Adriana Cavarero’s 
work, the thesis is an attempt to “snatch” back the feminine discourse of Diotima’s 
speech from its male-centered symbolic surroundings through the figure of 
Dionysus.
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Introduction
Socrates’ statement in Plato’s Symposium that he had learnt all he knew about eros 
from a woman called Diotima has been longstanding issue for the interpreters of the 
speech. Most of the traditional scholarly work interpreting the Symposium has stripped 
it from its gendered-wess, and scholars who have dealt with the gender-implications of 
the dialogue, did so to purify the text’s “reference to the unspeakable vice of the 
Greeks,”1 i.e. male-to-male love.
The emergence of gender-sensitivity and feminist re-readings of the 
Symposium brought about new implications of the eras-concept elaborated in 
Diotima’s speech. However, the feminist analyses are often methodologically closed to 
one another, appropriating Diotima’s speech for their own -  ideologically loaded -  
interpretation. The goal of this thesis is to explore the methodological problems and 
possibilities of interpreting Diotima’s speech and to suggest a gender-oriented 
interpretation of my own.
A gender-oriented textual investigation of the Symposium with a philosophical 
perspective can be realized in an interdisciplinary manner. The philosophy of sexual 
difference, modem hermeneutics, methods from literary theory and classical philology 
will be employed in the project.
1 E. M. Forster, Maurice (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 50.
The structure o f  the thesis
The first chapter locates the thesis in its broader framework and articulates its stance 
within the feminist project of re-thinking and re-reading the philosophical tradition. 
The feminist project of re-reading the canon problematizes the exclusion of women 
from the Western philosophical tradition and its intrinsic gender biases. I will provide 
an overview of the main concepts, issues and directions of this project, based on the 
works of Charlotte Witt and Nancy Tuana. This will be followed by a brief 
introduction to the main target of my thesis, the Symposium.
In Chapter Two, I will introduce Luce Irigaray and Andrea Nye’s articles on 
Diotima’s speech. These articles and the methodological clash between them will be 
used as a starting point to explore different aspects of Diotima’s speech and different 
ways of approaching it. First, I will elaborate on the question of interpretation, then 
based on my findings will turn to the other issues addressed by the two articles in 
Chapter Three.
The Nye -  Irigaray debate problematized from a wider perspective leads us into 
the realm of hermeneutics. My presupposition is that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
dialogical approach to interpretation might serve as an intermediary between the 
methodological positions represented by the two articles and enable them to enter into 
dialogue with each other as well as with Plato’s text. I am not to judge which article 
provides a more adequate interpretation to Diotima’s speech, rather, I accept both 
approaches as relevant and will show that a joint use of their methods may illuminate 
deeper and more complex implications of Diotima’s teaching.
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After opening up Diotima’s speech as well as the two articles for dialogue, I 
will evoke Wolfgang Iser’s model of interpretation as an aid to keep the text open, so 
that it cannot be appropriated by any one way of reading. I will analyze Wolfgang 
Iser’s concept of liminal space, the intermediary between reality and knowledge, to 
show how that intermediary is shaped by and also shapes the register of interpretation 
-  providing energy for further interpretation.
The extensive discussion about the theoretical considerations of Gadamer and 
Iser in relation to the Nye -  Irigaray discord is to emphasize the importance of 
developing a carefully selected set of tools in order to enter into dialogue with a text -  
a collection of methodological instruments which are apt to change in the process of 
questioning and being questioned by the text.
Chapter Three will turn to the different aspects of Diotima’s speech as 
pinpointed by Irigaray and Nye. These aspects concern Diotima’s voice, the female in 
the speech, and hierarchization. I will analyze these questions on the basis of several 
existing interpretations of Diotima’s speech, while expressing my own stance 
regarding these matters. My thesis is that Alcibiades’ speech serves as a prism through 
which Diotima’s speech can be understood: Alcibiades highlights the Dionysiac side 
of Diotima’s teaching and I assume that this Dionysiac side has an important role in 
understanding Diotima’s eros and in unfolding its gender implications.
The analysis of the main aspects of the speech from a gender point-of-view 
pursued in Chapter Three opens the ground for a semiotic investigation of Diotima’s 
speech in the light of sexual difference. This will be carried out in Chapter Four. The 
notion of sexual difference enables us to recognize Diotima as a male construct of a 
female image that Plato creates in order to appropriate the female experience of birth
to his philosophy. David Halperin’s study on Diotima and Adriana Cavarero’s work 
will be used to explore this territory. My analysis is in alliance with the hermeneutic 
project of Cavarero, which sets out to dismantle the workings of the patriarchal 
symbolic order and re-appropriate its female mythic figures with the intention of 
sketching a female symbolic order, where female sexual difference does not get 
contained and the female can be positively represented, not merely as lack or the other. 
The problem areas investigated in this chapter are: mimetic male desire for female 
experience, immortality, and the figure of the birth-giving male. I attempt to “snatch” 
back the feminine discourse of Diotima’s speech from its male-centered symbolic 
surroundings through the Dionysiac.
Finally, the Conclusion will weave together the central themes of the thesis, 
summarizing what it has achieved and also pointing out possible directions in which 
further investigation(s) of the dialogue may be carried out.
Eros and gender
The two concepts arcing over this thesis are gender and eros. It is important to clarify 
how I shall use these notions:
a, eros
To say that the Symposium is about love would be an oversimplification, since eros is 
a certain type of love and the notion of eros becomes an epistemological concept in 
Plato’s oeuvre. Different understandings of the concept of eros will appear throughout 
the entire thesis, based on the different meanings attached to it both by the speakers
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and the interpreters of the dialogue. Here, at the beginning, I would simply state that 
eros is a desire the goal o f which is beyond itself This desire may be a drive towards 
both physical and intellectual knowledge, as well as towards acquiring virtue(s). Eros, 
conceived of this way, is a process that takes place in the form of relationship and 
interaction, i.e. dialogue, between human beings. Platonic dialogue is in this sense 
erotic, and the same way Platonic eros is philosophic, as it emerges through dialogue.
An important focus of gender-conscious analyses (e.g. Irigaray and Nye) of the 
Symposium concerns the role of the female in this desire for physical and intellectual 
knowledge. Due to the variant meanings of eros, I will use the word in italics 
throughout the thesis except for the section where I summarize the speeches of the 
Symposium. There I shall stick to the spelling used in W. R. M. Lamb’s edition: 
»Eros«.3
b, gender
The multifarious, often conflicting, understandings of the concept of gender within 
scholarship make the term highly problematic. I will restrict the following description 
to my understanding of the notion, as it is used in the thesis. It is a strategic move not 
to define gender, as defining it would solidify the notion, universalizing it into a ready­
made concept that can be applied to different socio-cultural settings, while in fact 
gender manifests itself simultaneously through and together with those settings 
themselves.
2 Maria Joo, “A platoni ‘erosz’-rol -  feminista interpretaciok kapcsan (On Platonic ‘Eros’ -  Considering 
Feminist Interpretations),” Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (1996/1-2-3): 1-29, 2.
3 Plato, Lysis; Symposium; Gorgias, edited and translated by W. R. M. Lamb (London: Heinemann, 
1925). All quotations from the Symposium throughout the thesis, unless marked otherwise, are from this 
edition and were compared with the original Greek text.
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This conceptualization treats gender as a process, interaction, relations acted 
out within specific contexts in different times and places. It is a fruitful approach as, on 
the one hand, it brings about the immediate recognition of gender’s embeddedness in a 
network of power relations and highlights other forms of oppression, including those 
based on race, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation; while, on the other hand, it helps 
one avoid false generalizations and attempts at universalization (two underlying 
tendencies within gender theory initially critiqued by postmodern feminism, women of 
color and lesbian feminists).
One common approach within the different understandings of gender is the 
attempt to denaturalize the notion, that is, to disrupt the view that considers the 
male/female binary opposition as natural and believes in two fixed genders, which are 
marked by external genitalia as biological foundation. Every attempt to undermine this 
view (which is often reiterated in the subversive attempts themselves) includes 
problematizing gender in its historicity and context-specificity.
Joan Scott’s insight into the possible uses of gender as an analytic tool 
incorporates many of the above described ideas. Scott understands gender as “a 
constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the 
sexes.” As a constitutive element, gender incorporates: 
cultural symbols,
- the “normative statements” that aim at controlling the possible meanings of 
cultural symbols via the techniques of containment and limitation,
“social institutions and organizations” (e.g. kinship systems, education, 
economy, politics) and
“subjective identity” (the gendered enculturation of individuals).4
These four levels are interrelated and create a subtle network that serves as “a primary 
field within which or by means of which power is articulated.”5 This field, as stated 
above is closely linked with other forms and systems of oppression. Gender analyses 
have to keep in mind the multiplicity of experiences within each setting as well as the 
diversity of modes and networks of oppression in different socio-cultural 
environments.
Two more issues regarding gender will gain significance within the thesis, 
which need to be clarified. One is the role of the subject within gender as a process and 
the other is the sex/gender distinction. Following Cavarero’s observations, the thesis 
emphasizes that the Symposium is a key text in the separation of body and soul -  a 
cornerstone of Western metaphysics. As opposed to this dualism, Diotima’s eros is 
opened up for interpretation as a possible bridge between the separated lives of the 
soul (our thinking part) and the body. In accord with this approach, the notion of 
gender is used with caution throughout the thesis: I do not draw the sex/gender 
distinction because it resonates with a body/mind distinction and also suggests a 
dualistic relation, both of which I avoid reiterating.
Moira Gatens’ work shows that falling back on this distinction can be escaped 
precisely through a recognition of the active role of both the mind and the body within 
the process of (en)gender(ing). She emphasizes that focusing on the subject, instead of 
consciousness, when analyzing gender, draws our attention to “the active processes
4 Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” The American Historical Review 
91 (1986, Winter): 1053-75, 1067.
5 Ibid.
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involved in becoming a signifying subject.”6 Gatens uses the notion of the imaginary 
body to frame an analytical matrix for this endeavor. The imaginary body, or body- 
phantom, is the physical image of our body, as we conceive of it. This image is 
essential “in order for us to have motility in the world, without which we could not be 
intentional subjects.”7 The imaginary body is gradually acquired in its relation to the 
image of other subjects. It is characterized by its specific socio-cultural framework, as 
well as the physical and psychological history of the individual.
An analysis of the imaginary body will show it to be the site of the historical 
and cultural specificity of masculinity and femininity. It is to the imaginary body that 
we must look to find the key or the code to the deciphering of the social and personal 
significance of male and female biologies as lived in culture, that is masculinity and 
femininity.8
Besides showing the active role of the mind and the body within gendered 
enculturation, Gatens provides new directions for unraveling the complex network of 
the different layers in which gender operates. Reading the imaginary body will turn it 
into a map through which the social, the historical, the cultural and the economic 
spheres can be explored with regard to their gender implications. This approach also 
helps us gain a subtler understanding of the relationship between the biological and the 
cultural.
Based on Gatens’ conceptualization of the terms, I use the notions of 
masculinity and femininity “as forms of sex-appropriate behaviours,” which are 
“manifestations of a historically based culturally shared phantasy about male and
6 Moira Gatens, “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,” in Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and 
Corporeality (London: Routledge, 1996), 3-21.
7 Ibid, 12.
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female biologies,”9 while the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ generally designate biological 
difference. In accordance with this, the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ refer to animate 
male and female subjectivities -  in their sexed bodies and above described 
complexities. On the grounds of these considerations, I understand gender as the body 
in its situatedness, or “biology-as-lived in a social and historical context.”10
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 13.
10 Ibid, 14.
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Chapter 1
1.1 Re-reading the canon, re-reading Plato
The Western philosophical tradition is not gender-neutral. The general perspective of 
the thinking subject is that of the educated white male in the philosophical canon. In 
the past two and a half decades re-reading and re-forming that canon has been an 
important element of feminist writing. This development can also be detected in the 
realm of literature and history. The two most significant issues concerning the re­
reading of the philosophical canon are: historical exclusion and the tradition’s 
connecting the female to matter, to the irrational, as opposed to the male norms of 
reason and objectivity. These norms, overtly in words or covertly in symbols and 
metaphors, have excluded the feminine from the philosophical discourse throughout 
the centuries. What had been claimed to be universal for more than two millennia, 
proved to be biased with the emergence of gender-sensitivity.
Applying the category of gender to the philosophical tradition has showed how 
the canon is intertwined with misogyny and how the supposedly universal ideas are 
gender biased. Such partialities may not only appear explicitly or implicitly (in the 
form of words or symbols/metaphors), but may also be generic to the theory itself. 
Charlotte Witt introduces the concepts of intrinsically and extrinsically gendered 
notions. According to her, an intrinsically gendered notion is a concept “that 
necessarily carries implications regarding gender,” while “an extrinsically gendered
12
notion typically does carry implication about gender, but not necessarily so.”11 A 
gender-oriented interpretation of philosophical concepts may show whether the 
concepts are inherently sexist and gendered. If gendered notions (ideas implicitly or 
explicitly connected to gender and sexual difference) can be removed without altering 
the theory, then gender associations are not an inherent part of the given theory, which, 
then, is not necessarily biased against women.
What if a notion is gender biased? What should be the next step for the gender 
conscious re-reader of the canon? Nancy Tuana, in her preface to the book Feminist 
Interpretations o f Plato points out that re-reading the canon may be a fruitful method 
to revise our philosophical tradition from “the margins of philosophy.”12 She 
advocates critical awareness about the tendency of the canonized philosophical notions 
to offer a universal perspective and points out the importance of exploring the gender 
ideologies inscribed in those notions. She also states that, while re-reading a text of the 
canon, one has to investigate the extent to which “socially inherited prejudices,” i.e. 
biases, are part of the philosopher’s “larger philosophical framework,” and “the ways 
in which the definitions of central philosophical concepts implicitly include or exclude 
gendered traits.” 13
Tuana’s approach is similar to the attitude proposed in Gregory Vlastos’ article 
“Was Plato a Feminist?”14 Vlastos points out that Plato’s strength in the way of
11 Charlotte Witt, “Feminist History of Philosophy,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (Winter 2000 Edition), accessed: 26 November 2005, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2000/entries/feminism-femhist/>, section 1.3, “Synoptic 
Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon.”
12 Nancy Tuana (ed.), “Preface,” to Nancy Tuana (ed.), Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations 
o f Plato (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), i-xi, x.
13 Ibid, xi.
14 Gregory Vlastos, “Was Plato a Feminist?” in Nancy Tuana (ed.), Feminist Interpretations o f Plato 
(see above), 11-23.
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treating women within his philosophical framework is that he could separate his era’s 
and his own prejudices about women from “the dictates of moral theory,”15 an 
achievement rarely found in philosophers’ works. I find it important to keep Vlastos’ 
differentiation of moral theory and social prejudices in mind when analyzing 
Diotima’s speech. This basic attitude may help us to navigate among the different 
ways and levels in interpreting Plato’s oeuvre and Diotima’s teaching.
“Synoptic interpretations of the canon” argue that the basic pillars of the 
philosophical canon, such as the notions reason and objectivity, are gendered as
1 17male. Genevieve Lloyd, in her classic analysis entitled The Man o f Reason, shows 
how reason has been implicitly associated with maleness through the history of 
Western philosophical thought. Lloyd claims that, from the Pythagoreans on,
[rjational knowledge has been construed as a transcending, transformation or 
control of natural forces; and the feminine has been associated with what1 Rrational knowledge transcends, dominates or simply leaves behind.
According to Lloyd, our ideals of reason carry an “implicit maleness” and also the 
exclusion of the feminine. She postulates that femininity itself has been “partly 
constituted through such processes of exclusion.”19
While one might draw the conclusion that, owing to their being gendered male, 
reason and objectivity should be rejected as such, this thesis follows the approach that 
these notions should be critically analyzed instead, for the very same reason. In my 
view, a gender-conscious investigation of the canon should enable a productive
15 Ibid, 23.
16 Charlotte Witt, section 1.3, “Synoptic Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon.”
17 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man o f Reason (London: Routledge, 1993), 1-2.
18 Ibid, 2.
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problematization of the philosophical tradition through the re-thinking of its notions. 
Such a problematization may reveal whether and to what extent those notions are 
applicable or acceptable from a gender-informed point of view.
The two feminist theorists whose notions and concepts are of crucial 
importance for the following investigations are Luce Irigaray and Adriana Cavarero. 
Both Irigaray and Cavarero have been engaged in re-reading the canon. Irigaray’s 
work proceeds alongside the approach that our philosophical tradition is gendered as 
male. She employs psychoanalytic theory and deconstructs philosophical texts based 
on their inner contradictions. She traces how the feminine gets repressed within those 
texts and how patriarchal thinking fails to recognize sexual difference. Her article will 
be the starting point of my investigations about Diotima’s speech in Chapter Two.
Adriana Cavarero’s conceptual framework is based on Irigaray’s philosophy of 
sexual difference and Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality. The concept of birth, as the 
locus of female power, plays a central role in Cavarero’s work. She dismantles the 
patriarchal symbolic order, which she interprets to be based on the symbolic 
debasement of motherhood, and delineates an alternative symbolic representation 
through the figure of the mother. Her technique entails the re-appropriation of female 
mythic figures for a feminine symbolic order, which is not based on the phallus and 
recognizes sexual difference. I will strongly rely on her analysis of Diotima’s figure 
while investigating Diotima’s speech in the light of sexual difference in Chapter Four.
Both Irigaray’s and Cavarero’s works concentrate on the cultural-psychological 
axis of the workings of gender-biases within the framework of philosophy and more 
specifically, Diotima’s Symposium-speech. As I stated earlier, I will open up my topic
19 Ibid, xix.
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through introducing two different approaches to the Diotima-speech within the 
Symposium -  those of Irigaray and Nye. The divergence between the two articles 
illuminates many interesting aspects about the possibilities of interpreting Diotima’s 
speech, as well as about interpretation as such. Before perusing these two pieces of 
writing, let us start with a brief introduction to the Symposium and its historical 
context, as well as a summary of the speeches contained in the dialogue.
1.2 The Symposium
1.2.1 An introduction to the dialogue
The Symposium is one of Plato’s best-known dialogues -  or at least, one that is 
supposed to be well-known because of two concepts related to it. One comes from 
Aristophanes’ speech: the concept of the androgyn. The cosmogony provided by the 
comedy writer occasionally has been treated as the core of the dialogue, while at other 
times it is qualified as a “parody of a cosmogony” or “simply humorous and 
dramatic.” The other concept, platomc love, has become a household expression, 
although it is not completely clear how this concept became so common, given that its
91common sense meaning is so “un-Platonic.” While platonic love is generally used to 
explain a relationship without the sexual element, according to Diotima’s teaching, the 
path to absolute Beauty starts from physical affection.
As the placing of the dialogue within the Platonic oeuvre shows gender 
implications in itself, a brief introduction is called for here. On the basis of Karl
20 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1960), 209; 219.
21 Ibid, 209.
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Friedrich Hermann’s periodization, Plato scholars differentiate between early, middle 
and later dialogues. Plato’s dialogues are usually referred to as belonging to one of 
these three periods. The Symposium belongs to the middle dialogues and was probably 
written between 388 and 367 BC.
There has been a long-standing debate among scholars about the placing of the 
Symposium within the Platonic corpus. This debate is outside the focus of this thesis, 
so I will introduce only one version, that of J. E. Raven. Raven places the Symposium 
between the Phaedo and the Republic. His argument is that in Socrates’ version of love 
in the Symposium, one can look upon absolute Beauty with the help of eros. This 
absolute Beauty reappears in the Republic as the Idea of the Good. This concept is not 
concrete in the Phaedo yet, and there is no logical reason to think that Plato would 
have withheld the concept, when “its introduction could have done nothing but 
strengthen his case for the immortality of the soul.”22
As has been shown above, Raven’s argument for placing the Symposium into 
the Platonic corpus is built on the assumption that Diotima’s teaching, presented by 
Socrates, fits coherently into Plato’s philosophy. Indeed, one of the difficulties of 
interpreting Plato’s dialogues lies in distinguishing between Plato’s logos, Socrates’ 
logos, and the simple opinion of a character within the work. In the case of Diotima’s 
speech, it is arguable whether the teaching about eros belongs to Plato, to Socrates, or 
to Diotima. Some feminist interpretations of the dialogue take the speech to be 
Diotima’s teaching and to be separate from the Platonic logos,23 while traditional 
scholars, like J. E. Raven and A. E. Taylor, insert the speech into the Platonic logos
22 J. E. Raven, Plato’s Thought in the Making (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 107.
23 Both Luce Irigaray and Andrea Nye share this view.
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and also, almost automatically, take away Diotima’s voice. This problem will be 
further elaborated on in Chapter Three, which will focus specifically on Diotima’s 
speech and different opinions around it.
The Symposium has a complex structure of embedded narratives. In 
narratology, this structure is called mise en abime.24 It is like a Chinese box, for one 
narration contains the other in the following way: Apollodorus narrates the events of a 
dinner party to a (unnamed) friend. As he was not present at this party, what he relates 
is Aristodemus’ account of the speeches that were delivered during the feast. His 
narration includes Socrates’ speech, in which Socrates recalled what he had learned 
from Diotima, the priestess of Mantinea. The structure is even more complicated 
because Apollodorus says that he told the same story a couple of days earlier to 
Glaucon. This structure suggests, on the one hand, that Plato wants his narrator and 
himself to be distanced from the actual event. On the other hand, he seemingly intends 
to emphasize how Apollodorus’ memory about the story was refreshed by telling it just 
a few days before. In my opinion, any kind of answer to this question is conjectural. 
The only thing that seems certain is that Plato has some specific reason for structuring 
the dialogue this way, as this complicated structure of narration would otherwise seem 
redundant.
The dialogue takes place at a dinner party the day after Agathon wins a prize at 
the tragedy-contest for the first time, which means that the date of the event is January 
416 BC.25 The time of the narration is more questionable. Martha Nussbaum accepts 
R. G. Bury’s argument that since Apollodorus states in the introduction that Agathon
24 Slomith Rimmon-Keenan, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London -  New York:
Routledge, 1983), 93.
25 January was the month when the Dionysus festivals took place.
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left the town many years earlier (he left Athens in 408 or 407 BC), and that he is 
Socrates’ disciple at the moment (Socrates died in 399 BC), the time of the narration 
must be within this range, and probably in the last years of this period, i.e., between 
408 and 399 BC. Nussbaum points out that this argument does not discuss politics or
96Alcibiades. Alcibiades was so much the center of attention in Athenian society that 
the dialogue could not have possibly ignored the fact of his death, which took place in 
404. Therefore, Nussbaum argues that the narration must take place at the latest in 404. 
The Athenians’ “frenzy over Alcibiades”27 could also be an explanation for the 
eagerness of Apollodorus’ friend to hear the events of a dinner party that took place 
more than ten years earlier, and where both Socrates and Alcibiades were present. 
Politics and Alcibiades’ brilliant, but ambivalent career may be another reason for the 
distancing that Plato applies in the structuring of the dialogue.
1.2.2 The content of the Symposium
The dinner takes place at the prizewinner Agathon’s house. Since everyone seems to
98have a bad hangover, those present agree that there will be neither hard drinking, nor 
flute playing that evening, but that they will spend time discussing different topics. 
They send the flute girl out and Eryximachus, a famous physician of the time, brings 
forward Phaedrus’ remark that a eulogy of Eros has not yet been written.29 They all
26 Martha Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” in The Fragility o f Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 165-199, see pp.168- 
69.
27 Ibid, 170.
28 Dining a symposium, usually a wine king was elected, who represented Dionysus, and prescribed for 
the others the amount they had to drink.
29 Eryximachus actually uses the word ‘encomium’ (177B). “Formal eulogy in prose or verse glorifying 
people, objects, ideas or events. Originally it was a Greek choral song in celebration of a hero sung at
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agree that everyone will come up with a tribute one after the other. Thus the dialogue 
contains six eulogies of Eros. However, there is a seventh speech in the dialogue, that 
of Alcibiades. When Socrates finishes speaking, the drunken Alcibiades walks in with 
the assistance of the flute girl. When ordered to come up with a eulogy of Eros, he 
comes up with one of Socrates. I will briefly summarize the speeches to make the 
discussion in the following chapters easier to follow.
a, The speech of Phaedrus
Phaedrus, quoting Hesiod, considers Eros to be one of the most ancient gods. 
According to Hesiod, Eros had no parents, came to life right after Chaos, and is the 
first universal principle. Eros is the most ancient god and “the cause of all our highest 
blessings” (178B). Phaedrus claims that he cannot mention a greater blessing that “a 
man can have in earliest youth than an honourable lover or a lover than an honourable 
favourite” (178C).
Phaedrus’ definition of Eros is the least spiritual. In his understanding Eros is a 
sexual desire. He idealizes Eros between two males as the main drive for ambition: 
The “lover” will do anything to attract the attention of his “beloved”, and will avoid 
any disgrace in front of his eyes. Another thing showing the greatness of Eros is that 
only lovers are ready to die for each other. Phaedrus mentions the example of Alcestis, 
the only female person mentioned in the dialogue until Socrates’ speech, who died 
instead of her husband and her deed “was judged so noble by the gods as well as men”
the komos, or triumphal procession at the end of the Olympic games.” From: J. A. Cuddon, Dictionary 
o f Literary Terms and Literary Theory (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), 277.
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(179C) that her soul was sent back from Hades. Phaedrus asserts that this shows that 
even the gods “give special honour to zeal and courage in concerns of love” (179C).
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b, The speech of Pausanias
Pausanias’ speech is based more on moral ground than that of Phaedrus. He 
distinguishes two kinds of Eros. Eros is Aphrodite’s companion, and since there are 
two Aphrodites: “heavenly” and “earthly” or “popular”30 (180E), we can differentiate 
between two types of Eros as well. The earthly form of Eros may be directed towards 
either of the sexes, and is concerned with the body rather than the soul. “Heavenly” 
Eros is love between males. This love is directed towards young males, just at the 
threshold of manhood. The lover gains the attention of the beloved through the 
former’s qualities of the soul. This relationship, then, lasts throughout their lifetime. 
Pausanias also explains how the town encourages the lover, while the young beloved is 
inspired to reject him until he proves that his love is of the heavenly sort.
Pausanias propagates the favors the lover and the loved do for each other for 
the sake of virtue and he claims that the goal of their relationship is to achieve virtue 
through their love. “This is the Love that belongs to the Heavenly Goddess,” he 
claims, “heavenly itself and precious to both public and private life: for this compels 
lover and beloved alike to feel a zealous concern for their own virtue” (185B-C).
c, The speech of Eryximachus
Eryximachus agrees with the distinction of the two kinds of Eros, but also stresses the 
universal importance of Eros. He argues that we should not restrict the effect of Eros to 
human passions. In his view, both kinds of Eros are universal necessities, and we have 
to take their importance into account, whatever our job or activity is. The job of the
30 The “heavenly” Aphrodite is the daughter of Uranus, while the “earthly” is the daughter of Zeus and 
Dione.
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physician, for example, is to create harmony between the desires to replete and excrete. 
Eryximachus goes on giving examples like music, the harmony of the seasons and how 
everything in the world is made up of opposites. Eros’ job is like that of the physician, 
he achieves harmony between these opposites. Things unite and harmonize in Eros. 
Also it is Eros who harmonizes the relationship between gods and humans:
Love [Eros], conceived as a single whole, exerts a wide, strong, nay, 
in short, a complete power: but that which is consummated for a 
good purpose, temperately and justly, both here on earth and in 
heaven above, wields the mightiest power of all and provides us with 
a perfect bliss; so that we are able to consort with one another and 
have friendship with the gods who are above us. (188D)
d, The speech of Aristophanes
Aristophanes comes up with a cosmogony in his speech, which has been a center of 
debate ever since: there were three human sexes in the beginning, male, female, and 
androgyn (male-female). The male was the descendant of the Sun, the female of the 
Earth, and the androgyn of the moon. These human beings were round, had four arms, 
four legs, and two faces on a single head, looking in opposite directions. These 
creatures did not fertilize each other, but used the earth for procreation. As a
o  1
punishment for their hubris, Zeus had them cut into halves by Apollo. Humans 
suffered so much from this punishment that they embraced their other halves, longing 
for reunion, and they eventually died of starvation and idleness, since they did not 
want to do anything without the other. Zeus took pity on them and ordered Apollo to 
move their sexual organs to the front. After this, humans turned to each other for
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procreation, instead of the earth. If a male and a female embrace each other, they will 
procreate and if two males do, they will find satisfaction and may turn to other 
activities after that. This desire for our other half is Eros.
Those who were once androgyns, desire the other sex, those who were female 
are the “lesbian lovers” (19IE), and males attract those who were male. Aristophanes 
considers this last type of person to be the greatest, since they are the most masculine 
in nature. They chose males because they are attracted by what is closest to them in 
nature. Whoever finds their original other half, will never want to be separated from 
her or him, and they will stay together till the end of their lives in friendship and love.
e, The speech of Agathon
Agathon calls the others’ attention to the fact that the previous speakers did not make a 
eulogy, but praised what people get from Eros. He undertakes to describe Eros in his 
true nature: Eros is not old, but the youngest of all gods. He is loose-limbed, that is 
why he can enter every soul. He spends his time among flowers, since pleasant colors 
and scents attract him. He does not commit and cannot stand injustice. He is 
abstemious, since he is stronger than pleasures. He is brave, and he keeps even Ares in 
control, on account of his love for Aphrodite. Whoever gets touched by Eros becomes 
a poet. There is no Eros in ugliness, concludes Agathon.
f, The speech of Socrates/ Diotima’s Speech
Socrates declares that all he knows about Eros he learned from Diotima, a priestess 
from Mantinea. He says that he is simply recounting their conversation, which took
31 A complex concept, meaning unruliness, violence, arrogance, greed, and pride.
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place several years before. Socrates fits Diotima’s speech into the discussion by posing 
the same questions to Agathon as Diotima asked him during their recounted 
conversation. He implies that before listening to Diotima, he was at the same level as 
Agathon is at the time of the symposium.
Diotima starts with challenging the way of Socrates’ thinking in binary 
oppositions. Just as there is something standing between beautiful and ugly, or good 
and evil, Eros is neither a great god, nor a mortal, but a demon -  an intermediary 
between gods and mortals. He is like the true philosopher, who does not possess 
wisdom, but has a desire for it. Still, because he is aware of this deficiency, he is not 
totally ignorant.
According to Diotima, Eros is the son of Penia and Poros. While Penia was a 
beggar (the word “penia” means poverty), Poros is the personification of ingenuity. 
Eros is always lacking; whatever he obtains, he loses too. He is the desire for eternal 
beauty, for eternal happiness. Eros is also the desire for immortality. The way to 
immortality leads through him, by begetting an offspring, who can be a real child, or a 
spiritual product:
Now those who are teeming in body betake them rather to women, and are 
amorous on this wise: by begetting children they acquire an immortality, a 
memorial, and a state of bliss, which in their imagining they “for all succeeding 
time procure.” But pregnancy of soul -  for there are persons, [...] who in their 
souls still more than in their bodies conceive those things which are proper for 
soul to conceive and bring forth; and what are those things? Prudence and 
virtue in general; and of these the begetters are all the poets and those 
craftsmen who are styled inventors. (208E-209A)
If a man, who is fertile in his soul, is in the company of a young boy with a beautiful 
body and a noble soul, he fertilizes the boy in his soul. Thus they beget immortal
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children, like Homer, Hesiod, or Solon did. Still, this is not yet the highest form of 
Eros. The path to the highest form of Eros leads through male-to-male love. First, the 
man loves one body, and fertilizes it with noble thoughts. Then he discovers the beauty 
of all bodies, and becomes the lover of all beautiful bodies. After this, he turns towards 
the soul, realizing its superiority from the body. As a next step, he seeks and creates 
thoughts that make young citizens better. This leads him to recognize the beauty of 
deeds and laws. He turns his attention towards the beauty of sciences after this. When 
he sees beauty in all these things, he will not love one thing like a slave any longer. 
Contemplating this ocean of beauty engenders many beautiful philosophical 
conversations and thoughts in the lover, who gains strength and knowledge by this.
When a man has been this far tutored in the lore of love, passing from view to 
view of beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent, suddenly he will have 
revealed to him, as he draws to the close of his dealings in love, a wondrous 
vision, beautiful in its nature; and this, Socrates, is the final object of all those 
previous toils. First of all, it is ever-existent and neither comes to be nor 
perishes, neither waxes nor wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and in part 
ugly, nor is it such at such a time and other at another, nor in one respect 
beautiful and in another ugly, nor so affected by position as to seem beautiful 
to some and ugly to others. Nor again will our initiate find the beautiful 
presented to him in the guise of a face or of hands or any other portion of the 
body, nor as a particular description or piece of knowledge, nor as existing 
somewhere in another substance, such as an animal of the earth or sky or any 
other thing; but existing ever in singularity of form independent by itself, while 
all the multitude of beautiful things partake of it in such wise that, though all of 
them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither greater nor less, and is 
affected by nothing. (210E-21 IB)
Only the one who can see this absolute Beauty32 leads a noble life. The best
companion in the quest for this treasure is Eros, concludes Diotima.
32 Susan Hawthorne, Luce Irigaray, and Andrea Nye use the term beauty-in-itself, while other scholars, 
including Martha Nussbaum, use absolute Beauty. When dealing with the above-mentioned three 
scholars’ works, I will use beauty-in-itself, otherwise I will use absolute Beauty throughout the thesis.
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g, Alcibiades’ speech
When asked to come up with a eulogy of Eros, Alcibiades replies that he cannot praise 
anyone else in Socrates’ presence, but only Socrates himself. He starts with his 
appearance. He compares Socrates to the statuettes of Silenus, which hold a flute or a 
pipe in their hands, and when they are opened, the figure of a god appears inside. 
Alcibiades also compares him to Marsyas, the pipe player, stating that the only 
difference between them is that Socrates does not need any instrument to achieve the 
same effect on people, since whoever hears Socrates speaking, falls under his spell. He 
goes on to explain to his audience the state of trance he gets into when he hears 
Socrates speak. It is this enchantment that urges him to escape from Socrates, so that 
he will not sit by him and listen to him as long as he lives. He claims that Socrates’ 
speeches also fill him with shame because of the lifestyle he leads and because of the 
worthlessness of those things he holds as valuable.
Alcibiades also talks about Socrates’ power. He claims that though Socrates 
appears as the lover of young boys, this is only appearance. In reality, Socrates has the 
strongest self-control of all the people of Athens. Once, continues Alcibiades, he saw 
the inner beauty of Socrates, which was of the most magnificent kind. He thought that 
Socrates desired his beauty and Alcibiades decided to give him all that he wanted in 
order to hear all that Socrates knew. He tried to get Socrates into situations where they 
were alone, but Socrates never approached him. Then, Alcibiades decided to invite 
Socrates to dinner. On the first such occasion, Socrates left immediately after dinner, 
but the second time Alcibiades persuaded him to stay for the night. Still nothing 
happened, so Alcibiades offered Socrates his love and explained to Socrates that he
found him to be the only person who deserved his love and that he was the one who 
could help improve him. Socrates answered that if he possessed some power that 
would, indeed, help Alcibiades become better, he, Alcibiades, was offering the 
appearance of beauty for real beauty. Later, when they went to sleep, Alcibiades lay 
next to Socrates, embraced him, and they slept all night like brothers, or father and 
son, because in the morning Alcibiades woke untouched.
Alcibiades goes on to explain Socrates’ remarkable behavior at war, how brave 
and self-disciplined he was. He also saved Alcibiades’ life, when he did not leave him 
behind wounded. Alcibiades closes the speech by summing up in what ways Socrates 
is like Marsyas and the statuettes of Silenus in his speeches, his personality and 
behavior. Alcibiades claims at the very end of his speech that Socrates is rather like the 
beloved young boy, and not the lover, and warns Agathon not to fall into the same trap 
that he and many others have.
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Chapter 2
2.1 The Nye -  Irigaray debate
2.1.1 Irigaray’s “Sorcerer Love”
Irigaray begins her article entitled “Sorcerer Love: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium, 
Diotima’s Speech”33 by explaining and praising the strength of Diotima’s dialectic 
method. She claims that this method works in a different way from what we are 
accustomed to calling dialectical. While Hegel’s dialectic works “by opposition to 
transform the first term into a second, in order to arrive at a synthesis of the two,” 
Diotima’s dialectic shows the intermediary between two opposing concepts, which 
already exists and only needs to be unveiled. Her model is not based on the 
“destruction and destructuration of two terms in order to establish a synthesis, which 
is neither one or the other,” rather, she illuminates a bridge, the third element, which is 
the possibility for, as well as the motor of, “progression: from poverty and wealth, 
ignorance and wisdom, from mortality to immortality.” 34
This already existing bridge, or the intermediary, that comes between the two 
concepts is eros. Progress of any kind is rooted in eros and leads through eros, in 
Diotima’s view. Eros leads us to knowledge, both in the practical and the metaphysical 
sense. It is eros that is “both the guide and the way, above all a mediator.”35 Irigaray
33 Luce Irigaray, “Sorcerer Love: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium, Diotima’s Speech,” translated by 
Eleanor H. Kuykendall, in Nancy Tuana (ed.), Feminist Interpretations o f Plato, (see above), 181-195.
34 Irigaray, “Sorcerer Love,” 181.
35 Ibid, 182.
29
elaborates further on how eros as a mediator becomes both the guide and the way to 
knowledge:
If we did not, at each moment, have something to learn in the encounter with 
reality, between reality and already established knowledge, we would not 
perfect ourselves in wisdom. [...] Therefore, between knowledge and reality, 
there is an intermediary which permits the meeting and transmutation or 
transvaluation between the two.36
Thus, Diotima’s dialectic has four elements: the here, the two poles o f meeting, and the 
beyond, which is a beyond that never wipes out the here. As Irigaray explains, “[t]he 
mediator is never abolished in an infallible knowledge. Everything is always in 
movement, in becoming. And the mediator of everything is, among other things, or 
exemplarily, love. Never completed, always evolving,”37 and -  one may also add -  
always desiring.
Eros is the lover, not the beloved. This is why he always seeks beautiful and 
good things. He does not possess, but lacks these things. If eros possessed the objects 
of his desires, he would not desire them any more. He is in perpetual lack. However, 
he is not ignorant of the beautiful and the good. His desire for them is the proof of this. 
His position between opposites is exactly in accordance with eros’ daimonic character. 
He is a daimon, neither immortal, nor mortal, an interpreter between human beings and 
the gods. “Love is complementary to gods and to men in such a way as to join 
everything with itself.”
Being the child of Plenty and Poverty, eros is like the philosopher who is 
between lack and possession, ignorance and wisdom. Eros, this way, is the true
36 Ibid.
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philosopher, while also philosophy itself. This philosophy is not a stabilized, fixed 
form of knowledge, and is not separated from feelings. This is how eros becomes both 
the guide and the way -  to immortality within mortality. Diotima explains this aspect 
of eros the following way:
The union of a man and a woman is, in fact, a generation; this is a thing 
divine; in a living creature that is mortal, it is an element of immortality, this 
fecundity and generation. (206)39
Irigaray claims this teaching of Diotima never to have been understood. She asserts 
that Diotima, here, points out “the character of divine generation in every union 
between man and woman” in which case “[a]ll love would be creation, potentially 
divine, a path between the condition of the mortal and that of the immortal.” Eros, this 
way, is fertile before all procreation and its fertility is mediumlike, daimonic, offering 
to male and female alike the “immortal becoming of the living.”40 The procreation of a 
divine nature is only possible in harmony with the divine, which is unachievable for 
the ugly and only possible for the beautiful. This way, love between man and woman 
is shown to be beautiful, harmonious, and divine. Up to this point, Irigaray seems to 
agree with Diotima’s erotic teaching.
The aim of love is to realize the immortality in the mortality between lovers. 
Procreation and generation in beauty -  these are the aim of love, because it is 
thus that the eternity and imperishability of a mortal being manifest 
themselves. Fecundity of love between lovers, regeneration of one by the
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, 183.
39 Plato, Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium with Passages from the Republic and Laws, translated 
by Lane Cooper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). As it appears in the English translation of 
Irigaray’s article. See more on the issue of translation: pp. 33-35, footnotes 48, 61 and 62.
40 Irigaray, “Sorcerer Love,” 187.
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other, passage to immortality in one another, through one another -  these 
seem to become the condition, not the cause of procreation.41
But Diotima here begins to refer to cause in a way that Irigaray finds surprising. 
Diotima explains to Socrates “that the creation of beauty, of a work of art is 
insufficient, that it is necessary to give birth together to a child, that this wisdom is 
inscribed in the animal world itself’. Instead of “allowing the child to germinate or 
develop in the milieu of love and fecundity between man and woman, she seeks a 
cause of love in the animal world: procreation.”42
Irigaray detects a shift in Diotima’s speech after this point. At the moment of 
giving birth to an offspring, the child takes the place of eros as an intermediary. This 
would mean no problem in itself, but the child assumes the position of the beloved 
instead of the lover and is unable to carry out the role formerly played by eros. Hence, 
eros will be reduced to a means of attaining a certain goal -  the child. Irigaray 
understands this step in Diotima’s argumentation as placing the object of love outside 
the subject (a word she uses carefully in this context), which results in love losing the 
intermediary character that had given the strength of Diotima’s method up to this 
point. In being stripped of this property, eros fails to be a daimon; he is no longer the 
translator, or bridge, between mortal and immortal.
Irigaray argues that in the second part of Diotima’s speech, eros is reduced to a 
means that helps us in the direction of a certain telos (goal), and the emphasis is put on 
the goods for the society rather than on the regeneration of the individual. She finds 
that eros becomes a political wisdom, gets socialized, and becomes a collective good
41 Ibid.
42 T
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instead of individual becoming, a principle engendering creativity. At the same time, 
with the introduction of the child, there appears a differentiation and the 
hierarchization between those who are fecund in body and those who are fecund in 
soul. In bigamy’s interpretation, this differentiation excludes women from the path to 
beauty-in-itself. Also, within this path, beauty and the forms of love become gradually 
hierarchized.
2.1.2 Nye’s response
Andrea Nye responded to Irigaray’s essay with the article “Irigaray and Diotima at 
Plato’s Symposium.”43 She criticizes Irigaray’s argument on three grounds. First, she 
argues that Irigaray accepts the Platonic interpretation of Diotima’s speech, while 
Diotima’s beauty-in-itself clearly differs both from the form of beauty in the Phaedrus 
and from the concept of beauty that appears in the Republic:
Far from suggesting that the body is a degraded prison, Diotima sees bodily 
love as the metaphor and concrete training ground for all creative activities. [...]
The beauty-in-itself that the initiate in Diotima’s philosophy may experience as 
the culmination of her training is not a transcendent Platonic form. The initiate 
glimpses no universal, abstracted from imperfect particulars, but an in-dwelling 
immortal divine beauty, an attracting center that foments fruitful creation in all 
areas of existence.44
Irigaray, observes Nye, accepts the assimilation of Diotima’s beauty-in-itself into the 
Platonic logos. This interpretation solidifies the concept of beauty-in-itself and places 
it in the position of a Platonic Form. But Diotima, Nye argues, never talks about
43 Andrea Nye, “Irigaray and Diotima at Plato’s Symposium,” in Nancy Tuana (ed.), Feminist 
Interpretations o f Plato (see above), 197-215.
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beauty as a higher form excluding other forms. Diotima, in her view, does not talk 
about The Good, rather, about goods. In Nye’s opinion, Diotima’s path towards beauty 
does not lead through ascending while leaving the earthly behind, but through 
developing a more inclusive world-view and widening of one’s scope towards all the 
beautiful things in life. Beauty-in-itself is never rigid, but is an ever-changing “inner 
generation impulse at the heart of life.”45 This view is supported by Diotima’s 
statement (21 IB) that all the beautiful things partake of beauty-in-itself. Gaining 
knowledge of the essence of beauty enables the lover to love that (unconditioned) 
beauty in all its (conditioned) instances.
Nye maintains that scholars for many centuries have been trying to cancel the 
differences between the Platonic understanding of eros and Diotima’s version: they did 
not want to accept the fact that Socrates learned from a woman.46 (This view implies 
that the traditional interpretations of the Symposium were, indeed, gendered. From this 
perspective, the traditional interpretations are not gender-blind, but rather anti-gender.)
Nye’s second problem with Irigaray’s essay is the translation she used. It 
shapes Diotima’s speech to “make it compatible with Platonic dogma,”47 claims Nye, 
i.e. it promotes to the aforementioned interpretation of beauty-in-itself as an earlier 
articulation of the form of beauty. According to the version Irigaray used, the lovers 
desire to possess the beautiful and the good, while the lovers of Nye’s version want it 
to come into being for them.48 The lovers’ longing for a partner with whom they can
44 Ibid, 198-99.
45 Ibid, 201.
46 Ibid, 198.
47 Ibid, 200.
48 Irigaray uses the following edition of the Symposium: Platon, Oeuvres Completes, translated by Leon 
Robin (Paris: Gallimard, 1950). In the English translation of Irigaray’s article, the English quotations are 
from: Plato, Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium with Passages from the Republic and Laws,
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“generate new ways of thinking and living” is a key element of Nye’s interpretation. 
For them “love is the fruitfulness of interaction, the fecundity of dialogue,”49 as 
opposed to possession.
This reading serves Nye’s aim to separate Diotima’s teaching from Platonic 
philosophy: it shows that “Diotima’s lover is not the heaven-crazed lover of the 
Phaedrus who glimpses in his idol the dim reflection of an otherworldly vision he 
would like to reclaim,” i.e. to possess.50 Nye’s line of argument is that if the lovers aim 
at possessing something that already exists, the object of desire will get externalized 
into a rigid, already existing form, while if they create that very thing by their 
communi(cati)on, Diotima’s beauty-in-itself emerges from within the erotic process. 
The latter version clearly differentiates beauty-in-itself from Plato’s teaching of forms. 
Keeping the two separate is Nye’s technique for avoiding a relapse into the 
assimilating, and thus male-centric, traditional analyses of Diotima’s eros, which strip 
Diotima from her voice and authority.51
The questions of possessive love will be analyzed in detail in parts 3.2.1 and
4.2 of the thesis in relation to Alcibiades’ eros concept and possessive love as a 
stereotypically male way of loving, respectively. At this point, I will restrict my 
inquiries to addressing the issue on the basis of Nye’s argument. The Greek expression 
in dispute appears in section 204D, where Diotima asks Socrates: “What is the love of
translated by Lane Cooper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). Nye refers to the original 
French version of Irigaray’s article. The translations from the Symposium in Nye’s article are her own. 
She uses the following edition of the text: Plato, The Symposium, edited by R. G. Bury (Cambridge: W. 
Heffer and Sons, 1932).
49 Nye, 200.
50 Ibid,
51 See more on this issue in section 3.1 of the thesis.
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the lover of beautiful things?” His answer, is: “genesthai hauto,” which can be 
translated either as ‘to become his’ (Irigaray) or ‘to come into being for him’ (Nye).
Nye’s version is correct, but in no way exclusive. Her interpretation may be 
right as well, but her critique of Irigaray’s article fails on these grounds. The verb 
genesthai is an infinitive in aorist form. It means: 1, come to being; 2, become. The 
two translations actually differ as to the case of the reflexive pronoun ‘hauto,’ whether 
it is Dative of the Possessor or Dative of Advantage/Disadvantage. In the former case,
the beautiful things become his (or someone’s); in the latter, they come into being for
• • •him (or someone). Both versions are equally accurate from a linguistic point of view.
Nye strategically uses the translation that serves her interpretation, which is 
acceptable, while her critique of the other version is flawed.
Nye’s third criticism of Irigaray’s essay problematizes the methods Irigaray 
uses to dismantle Diotima’s speech. These methods come from Jacques Derrida and 
Jacques Lacan. Since Irigaray accepts Lacan’s view on language, Nye argues, she can 
only interpret Diotima based on that model. Irigaray expects Diotima to achieve an 
instance of ecriture feminine.54 In Nye’s view, Irigaray does not realize that Diotima is 
not in the subordinate position that the Lacan-based Derridian theory would expect her 
to take. She is a priest, a prophet, and a master. She does not enter into a “fixed system 
of meanings,”55 the Symbolic, when she speaks. For Diotima, there are no such things 
as subject, split or other. There are only selves in constant dissolution and renewal as
52 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 
349. The aorist emphasizes the action or occurrence itself and does not express the dimension of time or 
the mode of the action.
53 Herbert Weir Smyth illustrates the use of Dative of the Possessor with the exact same verb 
(gignomai). See: Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), 341-342. The translation I use in the thesis (W. R. M. Lamb) employs the Dative of the 
Possessor.
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they relate to each other.”56 Irigaray, claims Nye, does not recognize this and evaluates 
Diotima’s speech on the basis of whether she achieves a piece of ecriture feminine, 
which, as Irigaray explains in This Sex Which Is Not One, “resists and explodes every 
firmly established form, figure, idea, or concept.”57
Nye claims that Irigaray’s argument goes astray probably because of following 
the Derridian method of interpreting, without taking the dialogue’s historical, social, 
and cultural background into consideration. If we want to understand Diotima’s 
speech, asserts Nye, we have to understand that women played important sacerdotal 
roles within ancient Greek society. Diotima is a teacher, a priest, a prophetess, so it is 
not surprising that she speaks with authority. For her, divinity and masculinity are not 
in one-to-one relation. “She speaks out of a tradition of female power and female
co
thought still alive in Greek culture.”
Nye describes how the arrival of Greek-speaking invaders from ca. 2000 B.C. 
brought about a social transformation to the Aegean and Mediterranean areas. Through 
this change, the Minoan culture that worshipped a female deity was gradually replaced 
by a nomadic, male-dominated society with a male thunder god. Although women 
were more and more segregated and confined to the domestic sphere by classical 
times, they kept their power in several religious cults and rituals.
This tradition of female power makes it impossible to apply the Lacanian 
system of language and its Derridian subversion in interpreting Diotima’s speech, 
according to Nye. Though she admits that Irigaray successfully “disrupted sacred
54 Nye, 204.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, 211.
57 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, translated by Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke, (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), 79.
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Aristotelian, Platonic, and Kantian categories”59 with deconstructive strategies, she 
argues that Diotima does not take the role the Lacanian model and deconstruction 
would expect her to take, so this is not a fruitful method for understanding and 
evaluating her teaching.
Nye’s reconstructive method, as opposed to Irigaray’s interpretive technique, 
endeavors to comprehend Diotima’s figure and teaching in their “particular material 
historical context.” She attempts to reconstruct the socio-cultural background of the 
text and also consider the “identity of its author”60 in order to understand the teaching 
on its own grounds.
The two articles map numerous points of departure, which problematize 
different aspects of the speech and the possibilities of interpreting it. One of the raised 
issues -  Nye’s second point of criticism -  is the use of an adequate translation. While 
this is a really important point, it is too broad a problem for the scope of this thesis, so 
I will not elaborate on this topic. I accept that interpretation is translation and in the 
same way translation is already an interpretation.61 While Nye’s critique of Irigaray 
proved to be incorrect on this point, the whole issue highlights the extreme importance 
of using a correct translation of the Symposium, since several translations are
58 Nye, 207.
59 Ibid, 212.
60 Ibid, 206.
61 As we will see in the following sub-chapters, both Gadamer and Iser conceptualize interpretation as 
translation. According to Gadamer, interpretation, i.e. dialogue with a text, creates a common language 
with it through the fusion o f horizons. The act of translation is not qualitatively different from 
interpretation. The translator has to understand ( Verstandigung) the text in order to be able to mediate its 
meaning into the context of an other language. Coming to an understanding with the text is achieved 
through interpreting, which includes taking sides in several questions. A comparative analysis of 
different translations of Diotima’s speech would probably show many interesting aspects of the horizons 
of the translators themselves and their interactions with the Platonic text.
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interwoven with androcentric ideology and give space only to distorted interpretations 
of the dialogue.62
However, let us now turn our attention to other important aspects which the 
two articles point out with regard to interpreting the speech. There are four main points 
to be marked out. These are (1) Diotima’s voice, (2) the female in the speech, (3) 
hierarchization, and (4) methods of interpretation. As finding possible method(s) of 
interpreting the speech may give way to points (1), (2) and (3), I will start with the 
question of interpretation, and then turn to the questions of voice in 3.1.1, the female in 
the speech in 3.1.2, and hierarchization in 3.1.3.
The wider implications of the Nye -  Irigaray methodological discordance lead 
into the field of hermeneutics. Irigaray’s deconstructionist approach to Diotima’s 
speech and Nye’s reconstructionist intentions mark out two positions, which may seem 
irreconcilable at first. However, Gadamer’s view on the interpreter’s relation to and 
influence on the text to be analyzed, as well as his way of handling tradition, may be a 
bridge between these two points-of-view. Gadamer’s model of interpretation strongly 
relies on the Socratic method and on the way Platonic dialogue works. Gadamer’s 
method is highly erotic -  which is all the more reason to serve here as an intermediary. 
In the following part of this chapter, first, I will introduce Gadamer’s view on how one 
can enter into real dialogue with a text through questioning. I then will analyze
621 consulted many translations focusing on those parts of the dialogue that are considered problematic 
in this respect by Andrea Nye and Susanne Hawthorne (“Diotima Speaks through the Body,” see 
footnote 97 for details) and chose to use W. R. M. Lamb’s bilingual edition. Lamb’s language is 
somewhat archaic, but his translation is the closest to the original text among all the translations I have 
had access to.
63 For a description of the Socratic method, see 2.2.1.
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Wolfgang Iser’s concept of liminal space and how it shapes, and, in turn, is shaped by, 
the register64 of interpretation, while evoking the need for further interpretation.
2.2 The question
This part of the thesis is an endeavor to delineate a theoretical background for 
interpreting Diotima’s speech. My aim here is not to reiterate the debate between 
Irigaray and Nye, but rather to achieve dialogue between the two articles. Nye does not 
question, but simply negates, Irigaray’s approach with regard to Diotima’s speech. She 
does not measure the merits of Irigaray’s text in successfully opening up Diotima’s 
speech for interpretation, for making it a relevant, real, and living question.
What follows here, is a detailed summary of Gadamer’s theory on the art of 
questioning. This has a double relevance for us: it is a theory of interpretation through 
the model of dialogue and an analysis of the mechanism of Platonic dialogue. I will 
follow a dialogue-format while I review Gadamer’s theory by introducing his notions 
and summarize his ideas. I will also give my own response to his views as they relate 
to the topics opened up by the Nye -  Irigaray debate with regard to the possibilities of 
interpreting Diotima’s speech.
2.2.1 Unfolding the question
Gadamer asserts in Truth and Method that all experiences contain in themselves the 
structure of the question. No one can gain experience without questioning, he claims.65
64 Register is the interpreter’s set of choices and selections for dealing with the subject matter, according 
to Iser (for more on register, see 2.3.2.).
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A question whether something is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is presupposed in the recognition of 
something being different from what we thought it was. The openness that lies in the 
essence of experience is the openness of this ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This is the way the structure 
of the question is inherent in every experience. The logical form of the question and its 
inherent negativity peaks in a radical negativity, which is knowing that we do not 
know: the essence of the Socratic docta ignorantia, “the consciousness of not 
knowing.”66 The docta ignorantia appears in the Symposium as well, however, unlike 
in Plato’s other dialogues, the unfolding of the docta ignorantia gets narrated by 
Socrates as he recounts what an innocent he was in erotic matters at the time of his 
intercourse with Diotima.
Gadamer points out the importance of Plato’s finding that it is more difficult to 
ask questions than to answer them. He also explains how Plato’s differentiation 
between authentic versus inauthentic dialogue shows that one is only able to ask a 
question if s/he wants to know and thereby admits that, in a sense, one does not know. 
Those who enter into dialogue only to prove themselves to be right will find asking to 
be easier than answering. But their questions are not true questions.
For a question to become a true question, it is essential to have a sense that lies 
in the question. This he refers to as a sense of direction (Richtungssinn), which puts the 
questioned thing into a certain perspective. The emergence of a question “breaks open
rn
the being of the object, as it were.” The ‘object’ to be brought into the open is the 
Sache or subject matter, which becomes revealed through dialogue. The logos that
65 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall,
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1993), 362.
66 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way o f Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, translated 
by Michael Chase, (Oxford, UK -  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 159.
67 Gadamer, 362.
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exposes the object that has been opened up is, itself, the answer -  which is only 
intelligible through the sense of the question.
Plato’s recognition of “the priority of the question in all knowledge and 
discourse that really reveals something of an object” is of primary importance, claims 
Gadamer. A question is needed to break open the subject matter in order for us to be 
able to gain new knowledge about it. This way, we may say that “to question means to 
bring into the open.”68 The openness of the subject matter means that there is no 
settled answer to the question. It is not decided or determined yet. It is precisely the 
question that brings the subject matter into a position of indeterminacy, enabling the 
pro and con to be in equilibrium. The question only becomes a true question if it is 
open, having reached its openness through the state of undecidedness or equilibrium.
Without this openness, a question becomes apparent, Gadamer points out. An 
example for an apparent question is the pedagogical question, as it has no real 
questioner, or the rhetorical question, which has neither questioner, nor object. 
However, we have to see that there is a limit to the openness a question may take. This 
limit is seen as the horizon of the question. Limitation is just as important to the 
question as openness. We need to explicitly demarcate our presuppositions, which will 
map what it is that is still open. This shows that not only can questions and answers be 
true and untrue, but that the putting of a question itself can be right or wrong as well: a 
question is wrongly-put if it fails to reach the openness of its subject matter. This 
openness can be reached only if the questioning is clearly separated from the surely 
held presuppositions. Gadamer shows this through the example of the slanted question, 
which is not the same as its wrongly-put counterpart, as it includes a question, but the
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openness it means to reach is not in the direction that the question aims at. It has no 
real sense of direction, so it is not possible to answer it, unless its slantedness is 
corrected -  as the sense of the question lies in its sense of direction.
The characteristics of apparent and wrongly-put questions illuminate the reason 
for the lack of dialogue between Irigaray’s and Nye’s articles. Nye poses a question to 
Irigaray’s article regarding her method of analyzing Diotima’s speech, but her question 
is not a true question, as she does not open up its object, but rejects it instead with 
already settled answers. Her question becomes apparent, trying to show how Irigaray’s 
original question to Diotima’s speech had been wrongly-put. Before providing a more 
detailed analysis of this issue, I will first discuss the art of questioning in greater depth.
Gadamer claims that the basic relation between question and knowledge lies in 
the question’s openness in including both pro and con. For him, bringing the question 
to a decision is the way to knowledge. However, we do not reach full knowledge by 
choosing between ‘this’ or ‘that’ on the basis of the dominance of reasons pro or con 
‘this’ or ‘that’. We can arrive to full knowledge only through proving every 
counterargument to be wrong. As “[kjnowledge always means, precisely, considering 
opposites,”69 it is dialectical in its essence. Only the one who questions may gain 
knowledge, and the true question always includes the ‘this’ and the ‘that’, the ‘yes’ 
and the ‘no’.
First, however, the condition for the question has to be created and that is 
exactly what Socratic dialectic achieves. There is a certain lack of knowledge behind 
every instance of the urge to know. A “particular lack of knowledge leads to a
68 Ibid, 363.
69 Ibid, 365.
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particular question.”70 However, it is not easy to find out what it is exactly that one 
does not know. In order for the questioner to be able to pinpoint her or his particular 
lack of knowledge, s/he has to fight opinion, which through its tendency of self­
propagation strives to become general opinion, i.e.: doxa. The way the admittance of 
ignorance and the arising of the question takes place has certain characteristics:
1, The art of questioning presupposes the freedom of the capacity to withstand the 
power of opinion;
2, The way a question occurs to us is similar to how ideas occur to us. We usually talk 
about occurrence of ideas and not questions; however, ideas never manifest themselves 
in a completely unexpected way. There is a presupposed directedness in every idea. 
This directedness aims towards a certain openness, that is, a question.
3, These occurring ideas have the structure of the question. The springing up of the 
question is itself already an attempt to break open the subject matter, or rather the 
general opinion about what the question is directed to.
The secret of the art of questioning lies in questioning even further, which 
Gadamer calls the ‘art of thinking.’ This he sees as the way to entering into and 
conducting a real dialogue. However, this latter activity necessitates certain conditions.
71The participants, for example, should not “talk at cross purposes.” The partners have 
to progress in the same direction and at the same pace. One should not try to argue the 
other down, but the opinions of both partners should be considered carefully. This 
cautious deliberation is the ‘art of testing.’
70 Ibid, 366.
71 Ibid, 367.
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If to question is to make the subject matter open, or to put it into the open 
against the fixed doxa, what the questioner may achieve is to turn “the object and all 
its possibilities fluid.”72 This fluidity enables one to rid the object (subject matter) of 
its frozen state caused by the suppression of dominant opinion, which also tries to limit 
the validity of what is being said about the object. Bringing out the strength of what is 
said by either of the partners in the dialogue strengthens this fluidity and enables those 
conversing to question things in their complexity of possibilities. This is exactly where 
Gadamer finds the productivity of the maieutic method: the partners of the dialogue 
bring to light “the immanent logic of the subject matter that is unfolded in the 
dialogue.” This logic is revealed in, and also through, the dialogue, which means that 
the emerging logos is something that is possessed by neither of the partners in the 
conversation.
The other important condition for real dialogue is being able to “perform the 
communication of meaning” through elaborating a common meaning by “seeing things 
in the unity of one aspect.”74 Gadamer refers to this facet of real dialogue as the ‘art of 
forming concepts.’ He considers this art to be the original task of hermeneutics: 
“entering into dialogue with the text”, which is also the “restoration of the original 
communication of meaning.” Through being interpreted, written tradition is brought 
back into life. This process takes place through entering into conversation with the 
text, and this conversation is “always fundamentally realized in question and 
answer.”75
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, 368.
74 Ibid.
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Gadamer points out how Plato himself shows an example of keeping the 
subject matter and the dialogue about it alive by writing in the form of literary 
dialogue. This way, Plato keeps up the original dynamics of real dialogue, so the 
problematization of the subject matter does not solidify it in its written form, but keeps 
the “original movement of conversation.”
2.2.2 The Nye -  Irigaray debate(?) -  revisited
Based on the model outlined above, I propose that no real dialogue exists between the 
two articles. This way, we cannot call it a debate either. As it was Nye who answered 
to Irigaray’s article, let us see now, to what extent she achieved dialogue with 
Irigaray’s way of questioning. Nye’s analysis has two aims: (1) to show why Irigaray’s 
method of analyzing Diotima’s speech goes astray and (2) analyzing Diotima’s speech. 
For the moment I will focus on the dialogue between the two interpretations -  if there 
is any, I will turn to the latter in the next sub-chapter “The logic of question and 
answer.”
As stated above, I assume that Nye’s question towards Irigaray’s article is not a 
true question. Nye’s article is a wholesale refutation of the Lacan-based Derridian 
methods Irigaray uses. Nye does not open up the object of her question, i.e. Irigaray’s 
analysis, to bring it into the position of indeterminacy. Her article in this regard is an 
apparent question, its purpose is to show that Irigaray posed a wrongly-put question to 
Diotima’s speech, namely, whether it is an instance of ecriture feminine. However, 
Irigaray does not address the speech this way. She claims that Diotima’s teaching has
76 Ibid, 369.
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certain characteristics which satisfy the criteria of ecriture feminine, but it loses its 
strength in keeping the position of eros as the mediator and reduces it to be a means 
toward a certain telos. This statement of Irigaray is not considered, but argued down, 
by Nye. Instead of debating the statement itself, she only disputes the method that led 
to it. Irigaray’s idea is not opened up for testing, not turned fluid; it becomes frozen, 
suppressed.
What is most striking about Nye’s method is that she rejects Irigaray’s main 
point not only without considering its plausibility, but, without considering its 
legitimacy. She shows how she finds deconstruction to be a cul-de-sac when 
interpreting Diotima’s speech and gives a paternalistic slap on Irigaray’s shoulder for 
having fallen into that trap. This move, however, takes place only after Nye’s arrogant 
gesture whereby the classical philologist rules out the non-classical philologists from 
the game of interpreting ancient Greek texts. The least one can say is that there is no 
real communication between the two articles. However, I consider both Irigaray and 
Nye to enter into real dialogue with Diotima’s speech itself and regard their methods 
as not mutually exclusive.
Gadamer’s ideas about the logic of question and answer may be a useful frame 
for finding a bridge between the two articles and their methods, thereby enabling them 
to be on speaking terms with each other. My reason for establishing such a link lies in 
my presupposition that the methods used in the two articles for analyzing Diotima’s 
speech may achieve a fruitful dialogue that can move the conversation on and help us 
learn more about the speech.
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2.2.3 The logic of question and answer
Entering into dialogue with a text raises the issue of the logic of question and answer. 
Gadamer maintains that a historical text becomes the object of interpretation through 
posing a question to the interpreter. This original question put to the interpreter by the 
text and her/his relation to this question are essential ingredients of interpretation. The 
understanding of the text lies in understanding this question. This is the horizon of the 
question, which determines the sense of the text, and thus, of its interpretation. The 
interpreter has to understand the meaning behind what is expressed through the text, 
the question that the text is an answer to. Only with grasping this beyond can the 
interpreter have a first grasp of the text itself.
Nye and Irigaray, needless to say, already differ with regard to the questions 
the speech asks them. Based on this, they also do not agree on what they think to be 
the beyond, to which the speech is an answer. Irigaray seeks to determine whether 
Diotima’s speech successfully creates a new conception of eros, i.e. an intermediary 
between “immanence and transcendence,” an inner drive for self-generation. She does 
not question Diotima’s fictionality or whether her speech should be taken as a teaching 
that is completely different from those of Plato and Socrates. Even if the speech were 
an instance of ecriture feminine, it would not mean that it was not the product of 
Plato’s imagination and did not serve his philosophical purpose(s). Nye investigates 
the speech in its social and historical background, showing how Diotima speaks “out 
of a tradition of female power” and how her teaching is different from those of Plato’s 
or Socrates’ both in content and form. Irigaray considers the speech as a self-enclosed 
entity, and opens up the text for interpretation from the inside through unfolding its
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texture. Nye investigates the social and cultural background in and against which 
Diotima’s teaching stands.
In my view, Nye makes a mistake when not keeping in mind that the Diotima 
of the Symposium is a female image (and also an image of the female) created by 
Plato; she speaks through metaphors of female experience -  as seen by Plato. One may 
ask “why is Diotima a woman?” but one also has to keep in mind that Diotima is not 
actually a woman. I will deal with this question in Chapter Four, at the moment let me 
point out that I consider Nye’s argument to be flawed when she immediately rejects 
Irigaray’s view that eros, when directed towards politics and the flourishing of the city, 
may be used as a tool to found masculine order. A psychoanalysis-based semiotic 
approach to Diotima’s speech does not rule out the consideration of the socio-cultural 
background, on the contrary, it can fruitfully investigate the traces of matriarchy and 
female power as represented in the text (as will be shown in Chapter Four). As for how 
careful one should be with making an attempt to reconstruct the social and historical 
background in which the text was produced, let us turn our attention to Gadamer’s 
treatment of the problem.
2.2.4 Intention and meaning
With the question of reconstructive interpretation, one comes face to face with the 
issues of intention and meaning. In order to be able to find the beyond of a text, the 
original question to which the text is an answer, we have to presuppose that the text is 
an appropriate reply to that question. This ‘fore-conception of completeness,’ 
according to which the interpreted object must adequately express an idea (in the case
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of a work of art, for instance, an artistic idea) is an axiom of all interpretation in 
Gadamer’s view. Gadamer refers to R. G. Collingwood when he writes about the logic 
of this relationship between question and answer. Collingwood analyzes this issue 
through interpreting historical events, which he claims to become understandable only 
through the reconstruction of the question to which the event is an answer.
However, we are facing two questions here: ‘what does the historical event 
mean?’ and ‘did the event take place the way it was planned?’ In the same way, the 
interpreter can never presume that the meaning s/he finds in a text is in accordance 
with the author’s intention. Interpretation, according to Gadamer should focus on the 
meaning, rather than the author’s intention, as the processes in the author’s mind are 
impossible to reconstruct -  unlike the question that the text is an answer to, in the light 
of which it gains its meaning. The point where Gadamer departs from Collingwood is 
exactly where Collingwood considers it unreliable to make a differentiation between 
the question the text was meant to be an answer to, on the one hand, and the question 
to which the text IS an answer, on the other.
It is precisely by separating these two questions that Gadamer takes his 
position against historicism. Historicism reduces the two questions to one and 
considers it scientific to attempt to reproduce the actual process of the text’s coming 
into existence. This approach, whereby a process can be understood fully only after it 
is artificially reproduced, is the scientific method known and used in natural sciences. 
Gadamer strongly opposes this attitude within the field of interpretation:
I have asserted, on the contrary, that every historian and philologist must 
reckon with the fundamental non-definitiveness of the horizon in which his 
understanding moves. Historical tradition can be understood only as
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something always in the process of being defined by the course of events. 
Similarly, the philologist dealing with poetic or philosophical texts knows 
that they are inexhaustible. In both cases it is the course of events that brings 
out new aspects of meaning in historical material. By being re-actualized in 
understanding, texts are drawn into a genuine course of events in exactly the 
same way as are events themselves. This is what we described as the history 
of effect as an element in hermeneutical experience.77
The text that is brought into the realm of dialogue through interpretation remains the 
same work, yet each of its re-actualizations shows its richness of meaning in the light 
of the ever-changing process of how texts are understood. Gadamer maintains that the 
reduction of interpretation to the author’s intention or meaning is just as inappropriate 
as that of a historical event’s interpretation to the intentions of those taking part in the 
event.
As we have seen, in the very first step of interpretation, the text poses a 
question to the interpreter. According to Gadamer, it is tradition that puts this question 
to us, we get puzzled by it and our understanding will include the task of mediating 
between present and tradition. This way, the original relation between question and 
answer gets turned around. The entity to be interpreted (text, work of art, etc.) poses a 
question to the interpreter, this way opening the interpreter before s/he actually opens 
the object to be interpreted by posing her/his question(s) to and about it. The only way 
to answer this original question leads through posing new questions. Only through this 
questioning, which seeks an answer to the original question, may the interpreter get to 
the reconstruction of the question to which the object of interpretation is supposedly 
the answer.
77 Ibid, 372.
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What is outlined above is, basically, what Gadamer calls the ‘fusion of 
horizons.’ The historical horizon of the question the interpreter attempts to reconstruct 
is included within the horizon that connects her/him to the tradition that posed that 
question. Therefore, Gadamer asserts, it is a hermeneutical necessity that the 
interpreter goes beyond mere reconstruction and considers certain aspects or things 
that the author accepted without questioning. The interpreter also has to bring these 
things into the realm of the openness of her/his question(s) put to the interpreted 
object. Through the process of understanding concepts of the past, the interpreter 
includes her/his own interpretation of those concepts. This way there are at least three 
worlds colliding here, that of the question to be reconstructed, of the interpreter’s 
present, and of the tradition of interpreting the object since its origins.
Gadamer claims that the hermeneutical experience gains its true dimension 
through the connection between questioning and understanding. He argues that the 
person who wants to understand may seek the object’s deeper significance instead of 
its immediate meaning and rather than considering the deeper significance as true, it 
should be seen as meaningful, thus opening the possibility for the uncertainty of its 
truth. “[T]his is the real and fundamental nature of a question: namely to make things 
indeterminate.”78 Hence it is questions that bring out the undetermined possibilities of 
a thing, thereby opening it for questionableness. The understanding of something as 
questionable is, itself, questioning. As Gadamer points out, the modus operandi of 
Platonic dialogue shows how a thinking person must ask her/himself questions. The 
meaningful possibilities out of all the possibilities that are opened up by questioning, 
then, will pass into the thinker’s own reasoning on the given matter.
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As already stated in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis is not to judge 
which interpretation of Diotima’s speech is more plausible. I consider both ways of 
entering into dialogue with the text as relevant. I claim that an interplay, a joint use of 
them would help the interpreter open up the subject matter for questionableness with a 
more complex understanding of deeper meanings. As a first step to this, a dialogue 
between the two ways of interpretation should be achieved. Gadamer maintains that 
just as each person who enters into a dialogue strives to reach an agreement with the 
partner, so does the interpreter try to grasp the meaning of the text.
Language is the form in which understanding occurs. When entering into 
dialogue with either a text or another person, understanding is the process through 
which the interpreted subject matter’s coming-into-language takes place. Each real 
dialogue, or true conversation, creates a common language that is shared by its 
participants. The sharing of the ideas takes place with regard to that common language. 
The conversation is successful if both of the interlocutors come under the influence of 
the truth of the subject matter, and if through this influence they do not remain the 
same persons they had been before. It is dialogue that creates a common language 
between the interlocutors through which the condition of the translatability of their 
ideas is facilitated.
How to make the two approaches communicate then? Based on Gadamer’s 
model, the answer is: under the aegis of Diotima’s speech. As I stated above, I 
consider both Irigaray’s and Nye’s analyses successful in reaching an openness of the 
subject matter. The fact that they make the subject matter speak (come into language) 
in different ways does not necessarily mean that the two interpretive methods are
78 Ibid, 375.
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mutually exclusive. On the contrary, if the two articles are read together via Gadamer’s 
dialogical approach, they may become complimentary to one another, enabling a more 
complex interpretation of Diotima’s speech and bringing new aspects of it into 
questionableness.
My goal is to open the subject matter for questionableness and also to keep it 
open, without allowing any of the interpretive modes to appropriate it. Iser’s model of 
interpretation as a performative act (which makes the subject matter function) may 
help us keep the different interpretive modes in dialogue, while also gaining fuel for 
further interpretation from their mutual interplay. Let us turn to Iser’s theory now in 
more detail to lay the foundations for a common language between Irigaray and Nye.
2.3 Interpretation
2.3.1 Interpretation as translation
Iser theorizes interpretation as an act of translation. The way this translation takes 
place depends on both the subject matter that is to be interpreted and on the context of 
the interpretation. As an act of translation, interpretation opens up a space between the 
subject matter and what it is translated into. Iser calls this space the Timinal space,’ 
which is somewhat independent of both the subject matter and what it is converted 
into, the register of interpretation. This register is characterized by many choices and 
selections, both conscious and subconscious. These selections will determine how the 
translation is realized and also, how the subject matter gets channeled into 
comprehensive structure. These selections are crucial in the way liminal space is dealt 
with.
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Translating the subject matter means, to a certain extent, a superimposition of 
some control upon it in terms of cognitive methods. However, the space that is opened 
up by the process of interpretation between the subject matter and the register will 
remain there, and in this way, the liminal space itself will be responsible for a certain 
extent of untranslatability that always endures. However, this residual untranslatability 
will also become the power that urges further interpretation.
Iser claims that the register of interpretation may utilize different operational 
modes, which depend on the subject matter and deal in different ways with the liminal 
space. While these operational modes are intended to implement control, their success 
depends on the degree to which they can be combined through a ‘mutual interplay.’ 
This (inter)play is both set off and shaped by the interpreter’s selections, and becomes 
the meeting point and melting pot for the operational modes which confer the approach 
for dealing with the liminal space. Each mode that the interpreter’s selection throws 
into this melting pot is tested against the subject matter and struggles to gain 
dominance over the other modes. As a result of this interplay-struggle of the 
operational modes, the liminal space, while empty up to this point, becomes filled with 
a dynamics of its own. This dynamics, with its unpredictable moves, is responsible for 
turning the liminal space into what Iser refers to as a vortex, which “draws both 
information and energy from what the subject matter is like and from what the register
70meant to achieve.”
This way, the liminal space, which separates, but also links, the subject matter 
and the register, has its own dynamics that needs to be processed somehow in order to 
release its inner pressure. However, this processing should not happen from the
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outside. Through superimposing the register on the subject matter (either its 
presuppositions or its concepts) the liminal space gets colonized, which, in turn, 
rigidifies the subject matter and freezes interpretation. How is it possible then to 
process the dynamics of the liminal space? Iser maintains that if the liminal space is 
dealt with as a nonlinear-organization, it will generate itself to be the “fuel for the 
dynamics that make the liminal space into a self-organizing system through which the 
complex structure of the liminal space is able to organize itself.”80 Through the 
interplay of the operational modes, their fine-tuning, and the process of the 
interpreter’s selections, the liminal space becomes a nonlinear-organization, which 
organizes itself and unravels, making interpretation into a creative act, a production. 
The phenomena that emerge -  or referring back to Gadamer, occur -  through this act 
are not identical either with the subject matter or with the register.
As it has been discussed, the register has two functions: on the one hand, it 
provides a path to the subject matter and, on the other hand, it provides the frame into 
which that subject matter is translated. There is a ‘structural coupling’ between the 
subject matter and the register whenever the latter intervenes with the former. These 
structural couplings bring about disturbances, or “noise,”81 which is to be processed, 
and the emergent phenomena will be different from either of those coupled. However, 
besides these emerging phenomena, the structural coupling also brings about a 
“continually emerging self-specification of the register.” This is basically a version 
of what Gadamer calls the art of testing, an important condition of the art of
79 Wolfgang Iser, The Range o f Interpretation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 148.
80 Ibid, 150.
81 The term comes from Heinz von Foerster and Henry Atlan. Quoted by Iser, 150.
82 Ibid, 153.
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questioning -  in this case, testing interpretative methods. Testing, or self-specification, 
of the register brings about further interpretation.
2.3.2 Interpretation as catalyst for further interpretation
Iser goes on to explain how the register has to readjust itself, to fine-tune itself because 
of the untranslatability produced by interpretation itself. While the liminal space as 
nonlinear-organization enables interpretation to become a creative act, it always stays 
between the subject matter and the register, thus, making the translation incomplete. 
This incompleteness provides further energies towards urging the readjustment of the 
operational modes. Iser calls this “self-produced residual untranslatability” autopoietic 
as “it is (a) the source of the growing complexity of register, (b) the change of register, 
and (c) the emergence of differently organized registers.”83 Iser concludes from these 
that interpretation has a performative character:
It makes something happen, and what arises out of this performance are 
emergent phenomena. The performative nature of interpretation brought out 
by the fact that it generates its own power, that is, the ineliminable residual
• RAuntranslatability drives the performance.
This way, interpretation is a never-ending process. It is an activity, which human 
beings are ceaselessly occupied with and it is marked by emergence. The incessant 
process of translating brings about the continual widening of modes and attempts of 
translation, which are modes and attempts to understand, to map, reality. Reality, of 
course, cannot be completely interpreted, so “we map it out into a plurality of worlds,
83 Ibid.
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for which the interpretation as emergence is a central activity.”85 Interpretation as 
translatability -  interpretation as emergence -  is the process of making the subject 
matter function. By translating something, we render it functional.
This reality- or world-mapping is performative, reversing the relationship of 
map and territory, according to Iser. The map does not denote, but “enables the 
contours of a territory to emerge, which will coincide with the map because it has no 
existence outside this designation.”86 The map, i.e.: interpretation, enables human 
beings to reach a comprehension of things that were nonexistent prior to interpretation, 
but brought to life and functionality through it.
The fact that reality is not accessible to human beings in its entirety is 
responsible for our eternal urge for ‘worldmaking.’ As interpretation is always 
incomplete (reality can never be interpreted in its whole), it is a necessity for us to go 
on mapping -  further interpreting -  which is the aim of this thesis as well. As a first 
step, I will give an analysis of the three problematic aspects of the speech mentioned 
above, i.e. Diotima’s voice, the female in the speech and hierarchization -  based on the 
already existing gender-oriented analyses. After this, I will go on with a 
psychoanalysis-based semiotic analysis of the speech, mostly based on the work of 
Cavarero. My approach will be informed by the socio-cultural background of the 
speech, as suggested by Nye. However, I will endeavor to open towards social and 
cultural aspects as they are coded in the text, while avoiding their superimposition on 
the speech. Based on the methods outlined above with the help of Gadamer and Iser, I 
will seek an interpretation through letting the liminal space construct itself with all the
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, 154.
86 Ibid, 156.
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inputs from the speech and the combined set of tools I am to apply throughout the 
analysis that is to follow.
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Chapter 3
3.1 Diotima’s speech
And now I shall let you alone, and proceed with the discourse upon Love 
which I heard one day from a Mantinean woman named Diotima: in this 
subject she was skilled, and in many others too; for once, by bidding the 
Athenians offer sacrifices ten years before the plague, she procured them so 
much delay in the advent of the sickness. Well, I also had my lesson from her 
in love matters; so now I will try and follow up the points on which Agathon 
and I just agreed by narrating to you all on my own account, as well as I am 
able, the speech she delivered to me. (20ID)
3.1.1 Diotima’s voice
It is telling to see how traditional analyses of the Symposium do not problematize the 
question of Diotima’s voice. Raven, for instance, interprets Diotima’s speech as 
Plato’s teaching, which Plato, through Socrates, “puts into the mouth” of Diotima, “an
87otherwise unknown and probably imaginary priestess.” He does not enter the 
question whether Diotima’s speech is different from that of Socrates’ or Plato’s 
teaching. He takes it for granted that if the speech is written by Plato and it is told by 
Socrates, it is Platonic logos. Raven’s attitude towards Diotima’s speech in this respect 
is not unique, but is in accordance with a tendency of traditional scholars in taking 
away the speech from Diotima. Taylor does the same, though with a different 
technique.
87 Raven, 108.
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Taylor argues that Diotima is probably a real person, but that Socrates uses her 
only for rhetorical reasons and that the speech, and its teaching, really belong to 
Socrates, not to her.88 The reason for Socrates to hide behind Diotima’s person, claims 
Taylor, is to avoid offending Agathon, whom he wants to court, by calling attention to 
his ignorance directly.
W. C. K. Guthrie, in his analysis of the Symposium does not enter the question 
“[w]hether or not anyone of the name [Diotima] existed”89 and considers Diotima 
simply as a double of Socrates, who is used by Plato for two reasons. First, the 
“fiction” of Diotima allows Socrates to keep his docta ignorantia through taking the 
part of the disciple in his recounting Diotima’s speech. Second, recounting the speech 
allows Socrates to use the form of dialogue within the framework of the Symposium, 
where everyone makes a speech, an encomium.
These scholars, like most of the scholars within the philosophical tradition, do 
not hesitate much before taking Diotima’s voice away. If the speech is called 
‘Diotima’s speech,’ Diotima immediately becomes an imaginary priestess (Raven) and 
if Diotima is considered real, the speech immediately becomes Socrates’ speech 
(Taylor). Guthrie considers the figure of Diotima simply as a tool for Plato to construct 
his text.
Although several feminist interpretations of the Symposium (e.g. both Irigaray 
and Nye) consider the speech to belong to Diotima, this does not mean that all feminist 
scholars who write about the Symposium take the teaching to be separate from the
88 Taylor, 224-25.
89 W. C. K. Guthrie, A History o f Greek Philosophy. Vol. 4. Plato -  The Man and His Dialogues: 
Earlier Period (Cambridge-London-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 385.
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Platonic logos.90 What makes feminist scholars (as well as gender-conscious scholars) 
different is that they all problematize the implications of Diotima being a woman. It is 
Socrates who brings the female into the male discourse of the Symposium by reciting 
what he learned from Diotima of Mantinea and it is through his speech that the issue of 
the presence and absence of the female emerges.
3.1.2 The Female in the speech
Socrates has a specific connection to the female. Danielle Trudeau points out that the 
Socrates-figure that is created by Plato in his dialogues has ambivalent character 
traits.91 Socrates is both the Perfect Citizen and an outsider that the state wants to get 
rid of. Trudeau calls this outsider or “homeless” feature of Socrates his atopos 
(strange, different) character trait, which is exactly what makes Socrates himself an 
eras-figure. Trudeau argues that one of the aspects contributing to this attribute is 
Socrates’ “feminine posture.”92 Trudeau does not only refer to what one might call a 
Socrates’ “drag” show93 (i.e., his playing Diotima’s part besides his own while 
reporting their former conversation in the Symposium), but to Socrates’ claim that he 
inherited his mother’s, Phaenarete’s, profession, who was a midwife. Socrates 
compares his activity on his companions’ mind to maieutique, midwifery, asserting
90 See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals o f Though: The Intelligence o f Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 486-500.
91 Danielle Trudeau, “Socrates’ Women,” South Atlantic Quarterly 98 (1999): 83-93, 83-84.
92 Ibid, 84.
93 Barbara Freeman, “(Re)writing Patriarchal Texts: The Symposium,” in Hugh Silverman (ed.), 
Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 
1988), 165-77, 167.
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that he helps his interlocutors give birth to the thoughts their minds are already 
pregnant with.94
We can see that Diotima’s way of questioning Socrates in the beginning of 
their reported conversation is similar to that process (from 20ID to 207C), while later 
Diotima’s speech ends up more as a monologue from 207C on, after having clearly 
defined what it is that Socrates does not know.
The link between Socrates and eros has been already shown. This new link 
between Socrates and Diotima suggests that Diotima, Socrates and eros stand for each 
other in the dialogue. Socrates acts out the role of Diotima, who, in turn, acts out the _ 
role of Socrates, while opening up the subject matter of their conversation through 
questioning Socrates, defining his “particular lack of knowledge”95 through his 
maieutic method. Diotima also serves as an eros figure by being an intermediary to 
erotic knowledge.
Irigaray’s article poses the question whether the woman can enter the path to 
reaching absolute Beauty, the path that Nussbaum calls the “contemplative ascent,”96 
or if she is denied the capacity of “pregnancy of the soul” (209D) and can attain 
immortality only through giving birth to real, not to spiritual, children. The use of the 
pronoun ‘he’ by Diotima and Plato in describing the ascent is due to the fact that the 
philosophical discourse of Plato’s era was a male discourse, just as modem Western 
thought was until recently. However, Diotima’s statement that the route leads through 
“orthos paiderastein”(211B), the right way of pederasty, i.e. male-to-male love, makes
94 See the Theaetetus (148-52).
95 Gadamer, 366.
96 Nussbaum, Upheavals o f Thought, 482.
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it more problematic to interpret the path to absolute Beauty as being open for the 
female.
Yet, the speech only makes sense if Diotima speaks from her own experience. 
Why else should she say to Socrates, just before starting to speak to him about the 
ascent, the following:
Into these love-matters even you, Socrates might haply be initiated; but I doubt 
if you could approach the rites and revelations to which these, for the properly 
instructed, are merely the avenue. (209E-210)
Susan Hawthorne claims that these “rites and revelations” probably refer to the 
Eleusian mysteries, which were secret doctrines, open only to the priestesses of 
Dionysus.97 As also shown by Karl Kerenyi, Diotima’s use of the words “myesis” and 
“epopteia”(209E) clearly refers to the Eleusian mysteries, myesis standing for the 
lesser mysteries, the physical rites in preparation for the highest form of spiritual 
initiation, the epopteia.98 Hawthorne, however, is wrong about the priests being 
exclusively female, as the main priest, for instance, was male.99 Nevertheless, as it is 
actually Diotima who widens the path for the male, for Socrates, from her being a 
master in these matters, we may suppose that she has already ascended the path. 
Diotima’s only doubt is whether Socrates himself is capable of reaching the goal of the 
ascent. Nussbaum takes the inclusion of women to be so self-evident that when
97 Susan Hawthorne, “Diotima Speaks through the Body,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering 
Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), 83-96, 94, note 22.
98 Karl Kerenyi, Eleusis: Archetypal Image o f Mother and Daughter, translated by Ralph Manheim, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), 45.
99 See Kerenyi, 110.
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analyzing Diotima’s contemplative ascent, she simply puts a female person in the 
position of the lover, who is to ascend the path.
The vertical direction that the word ‘ascent’ implies carries a sense of 
hierarchization in itself. We saw that one of Irigaray’s problem with Diotima’ speech 
is that Diotima starts hierarchizing after introducing the difference between those 
fertile in body and those who are that in their souls. Only the latter can embark on the 
contemplative ascent.
The inclusion of women can be assumed through the figure of Diotima, but can 
the teaching escape hierarchization between the ones who are pregnant in the body and 
those who are that in the soul? And what of the different levels of the ascent? What 
happens to who/what is left behind at a certain stage? These questions lead us to the 
following topic: hierarchization and individuality.
3.1.3 Hierarchization and individuality
Before going any further in the analysis of the contemplative path, let us recall the 
specific steps one has to take to be able to glance at absolute Beauty:
1. The lover must be in love with one particular body and “engender beautiful 
converse therein” (21 OB).
2. The lover realizes that all beautiful bodies have a common quality so s/he turns into 
“a lover of all beautiful bodies” (21 OB) and slackens her/his feelings for the one 
particular body.
3. The lover realizes that the beauty of the soul is of higher value than that of the body. 
S/he dedicates her/himself to the “betterment of the young” (2 IOC).
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4. The lover contemplates “the beautiful as appearing” in customs and laws (2IOC) 
and understands that these and the formerly contemplated beauties are all alike.
5. The lover turns towards the beauty in the sciences. S/he now contemplates a sea of 
beauty and is already free from the “slavery of a single instance” (210D) of beauty.
6. Contemplating the wide sea of beauty engenders in the lover many beautiful 
conversations and thoughts in philosophy.
7. With the strength and knowledge the lover acquired in philosophy, “suddenly”100 
s/he will be able to observe absolute Beauty, “a wondrous vision, beautiful in its 
nature”(210E).
The first question I will elaborate on is that of hierarchy within the contemplative 
ascent and whether there is a way to avoid hierarchization while ascending the path. 
Julius Moravcsik differentiates between an ‘inclusive’ and an ‘exclusive’ interpretation 
of the contemplative ascent. According to the inclusive interpretation,
our eros widens as we make progress from stage to stage; we do not abandon 
physical and aesthetic love for the love of spiritual beauty, nor do we jettison 
the latter in favor of love of the sciences. We enrich our appreciations 
according to this view by keeping the former interests and adding to these 
newer ones.101
As we have seen, Nye uses the inclusive interpretation when writing about a more 
inclusive worldview one can gain from following Diotima’s teaching. Though this 
understanding of Diotima’s speech is more optimistic than the exclusive interpretation,
100 Many scholars pointed out the importance of this adverb, in Greek: exaiphnes (212C), because it 
recurs when suddenly Alcibiades, appears in the door as another “wondrous vision.” For a detailed 
analysis, see: Justina Gregory and Susan B. Levin, “Philosophia Aphthonos (Plato, Symposium 210d),” 
Classical Quarterly 48 (1998): 404-410.
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the reader has to consider the way the lover looks back onto previous stages 
“estimate[ing] the body’s beauty as a slight affair” (2IOC) and breaking free of the 
“slavery of a single instance” (210D) of beauty. The first two steps of the 
contemplative path as a “slight affair” and the need of getting out of the “slavery of a 
single instance” of the appearance of beauty (i.e. the beauty of the young boy), 
definitely imply a certain hierarchization.
On the bottom of the hierarchy stands the first “single instance” of beauty, the 
first beloved. What will happen to the loved one throughout the ascent of the lover? 
This question gives way to further questions such as: Does the ascent leave space for 
loving an individual person? If not, what does this love have to do with human beings 
at all? What will the loved one gain from the whole affair?
A. W. Price, analyzing the same problem, points out that there are two 
processes “at work in the ascent, generalization and ascension, displaying two 
directions of displacement of interest, horizontal and vertical.”102 Vertically, there are 
three main levels of the ascent: (1) love for bodies in steps one and two, (2) love for 
mental values in steps three and four, and (3) love of the sciences in steps five to 
seven. Within each step, there is a generalizing process, when the lover widens her/his 
scope, realizing that (level 1) the beauty of one beautiful body is “cognate to” (21 OB) 
that of other beautiful bodies, that (level 2) bodies, souls, customs, and laws share the 
same beauty, and that (level 3) all instances of beauty should be contemplated as one 
drop in the sea of beauty.
101 Julius M. E. Moravcsik, “Reason and Eros in the ‘Ascent’ Passage of the Symposium,” in John P. 
Anton and G. L. Kustas (eds), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Vol. 1, (Albany: Sate University of 
New York Press, 1972), 285-302,293. Quoted by Gregory and Levin, 410.
102 A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Caldemon Press, 1989), 39.
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Nussbaum argues that the beloved “is nowhere to be seen”103 by the time the 
lover reaches this third level of generalization. Her main critique of the speech is that 
the lover will lose her/his capacity to love the particular. The generalization process 
makes the loved one invisible. Socrates explains to Alcibiades that “the intellectual 
sight begins to be keen when the visual is entering on its wane” (219). This is a 
sentence from someone who has ascended the path and perceived absolute Beauty. 
According to Nussbaum, by the time the lover is able to contemplate absolute Beauty, 
s/he will be blind to seeing the individual beloved, or will conceive of her/him as 
“mortal trash” (21 IE).
Nussbaum asserts that the lover realizes at this level that all along the way s/he 
wanted to achieve the goal that has now been reached and that her/his love for the 
beloved was actually in itself “an attempt to get beyond” that actual love to reach “this 
divine good.”104 There are three important notions that are missing from the program 
of love Diotima offers, according to Nussbaum, namely: compassion, reciprocity, and 
individuality. She observes that what Diotima wants from the lover is an extreme level 
of disposition. When the lover is contemplating absolute Beauty, s/he is not disturbed 
by the problems of “mortal trash” any longer. Nussbaum claims that even if the lover 
turns her/his knowledge towards the city and fellow citizens, s/he will not be able to 
see other people’s needs and suffering because her/his perceptions are already too 
wane to see those things. Also, the lover is so close to immortality at this level that 
s/he cannot internalize mortals’ problems, and is not able to show compassion towards 
her/his mortal fellows anymore.
103 Nussbaum, Upheavals o f Thought, 495.
104 Ibid.
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The next thing one loses during the contemplative ascent, according to 
Nussbaum, is reciprocity. The lover shows no respect for the agency of the loved. 
While the lover uses the loved as a source to improve her/his creativity, s/he makes 
“no difference between loving a person and loving a scientific system, or the beauty of 
the entire world.”105 Nussbaum claims that this attitude is not too promising either 
towards the one person, or towards the other citizens. (I will argue against this point of 
hers in the sub-chapter about Alcibiades’ eros in 3.2.1.)
The third thing one has to give up while ascending the path is love for 
individuality. The lover is not attached to any “single instance” of beauty any longer, 
that is, the difference of one person from another is non-existent from the 
contemplative point-of-view. The lover loves only those characteristics of the loved 
that share something with absolute Beauty. From this follows that this love is not 
unconditional, thus it is precisely the human aspect that is erased from this type of 
love.
Price, however, does not agree with the assertion that the “interest in another
person fades out”106 as we follow the path. Finding this suggestion arbitrary, he
opposes this way of interpretation on the basis that the goal of the ascent is not the
“joys of self creation”107 but immortality. Price argues that the love for an individual is
retained with each step of the ascent and each new step is tested on the lover’s already
existing relationship. This way, the ascent becomes a full circle, or actually, as
1 08Hawthorne also pointed out in another aspect of the speech, a series of circles. The 
cyclic structure is present within the speech and the dialogue on many levels. I will
105 Ibid, 498.
106 Price, 53.
107 Ibid.
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return to this issue at the end of this chapter and to Hawthorne’s analysis in Chapter 
Four.
I accept Price’s argument on this point and will elaborate on the problem in the 
next part of this chapter, while analyzing Alcibiades’ speech. I will use Nussbaum’s 
observation that we face two different ways to knowledge in Diotima’s and 
Alcibiades’ speeches. Nussbaum also points out that one can interpret the dialogue 
only through looking at all of its parts, which build up the whole text. I also accept this 
point, and will use these two observations by Nussbaum to oppose her third claim; her 
view that Diotima’s followers will necessarily lose contact with the particularities of 
human beings when ascending the contemplative path. I will argue that the dialogue 
suggests on the symbolic level that Socrates is the intermediary between the two kinds 
of cognition we are introduced to in the Symposium. The reader needs Alcibiades’ 
speech, a Socrates portrait, to see this point clearly.
3.2 Alcibiades9 speech
Alcibiades’ speech was neglected by philosophical interpretations of the Symposium 
until recently. During the last couple of decades, however, more and more attention 
has been given to the speech. The reasons for both the former negligence of and the 
present emphasis on the speech are understandable if we look at the speech and the 
dialogue itself. Alcibiades’ words are anti-philosophical; he is actually telling a love 
story, the story of his love for Socrates. As a story of a particular love, not the search 
for the Truth about Love, the speech, until recently, has been considered to be poetic
108 Hawthorne, 88.
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rather than philosophical. For this reason Alcibiades’ discourse has been driven into 
exile from the philosophical discourse. However, even if the speech is a love story, it 
is a love story within the Symposium and a love story about Socrates -  two reasons to 
consider its implications.
Alcibiades’ description of Socrates may help us to understand Socrates and the 
way to practice what he teaches through delivering Diotima’s speech. Also, it shows us 
how Diotima’s teaching can be misinterpreted, as it does, in my opinion, by 
Alcibiades. However, I consider Alcibiades’ speech to reveal more than this. My 
presupposition is that Alcibiades’ speech serves as a prism through which Diotima’s 
speech can be understood. Alcibiades holds a mirror to Diotima’s teaching to show its 
Dionysiac side. I assume that this Dionysiac side has an important role in 
understanding Diotima’s eros and its gender implications.
The night of the narrated symposium is embedded between two historical 
events, both of which are referred to within the dialogue. One is Agathon’s triumph in 
the drama competition in 416BC and the other is the Greek expedition to Sicily led by 
Alcibiades -  a venture that turned out to be disastrous for both Alcibiades and Athens.
One of the greatest scandals from the chaotic history of Athens’ Sicilian 
expedition was that on the night prior to setting off, the hermas, the statues of Hermes 
placed at the crossroads, were systematically damaged. In Alcibiades’ absence, he and 
other members of the expedition were found guilty of the crime and were sentenced to 
the forfeiture of their property and to losing their citizenship.109
Since Alcibiades’ speech is full of references to statues (statuettes), it is highly 
probable that there is a reference to the historical event of the desecration of the
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hermas. Also, Socrates’ question to Alcibiades, “What are you about [to do]?” (214E), 
as Nussbaum observes, “reverberates ominously for us in view of our greater 
knowledge of what this man will soon be up to.”110 Alcibiades’ conceptualization of 
eros shows parallels with the political situation of Athens. A correlation can be seen 
also between the fate of Alcibiades and that of Athens, which is symbolically 
strengthened by Alcibiades’ wearing a wreath of violet and ivy, the former being the 
symbol of Athens. I will elaborate on this issue within the next sub-chapter that deals 
with Alcibiades’ eros concept.
3.2.1 Alcibiades’ eros
How does Alcibiades conceptualize eros within his speech? Why did Socrates rebuke 
his love? What is the relation and what are the differences between Diotima’s eros and 
that of Alcibiades? What are the political implications Plato inserted into Alcibiades’ 
speech? These are the main questions around which I will focus on in the following 
part of this chapter. Then, I will turn to examining how Alcibiades brings back the 
female into the Symposium and illuminates two separate ways of thinking with his 
speech.
As already mentioned, Alcibiades conceptualizes eros through his particular 
experience with it. He recounts how he fell in love with Socrates and was rebuked by 
him. After following Diotima’s teaching about the eros that is of help to us in having a 
glance at absolute Beauty through the process of ascension, Alcibiades pulls us back to 
the ground and makes us aware that our body is made of flesh and blood. He sets out
109 Hegyi Dolores et al., Gorog tortenelem (Greek History), (Budapest: Osiris Kiado, 1999), 195-98.
72
to “speak the truth” (214E). Alcibiades does not speak about eros or even about his 
own soul as if they were abstract concepts. He claims that his heart, or his soul, “or 
whatever one is to call it” gets “stricken and stung” (218) by Socrates’ philosophic 
discourses. To him eros is like being bitten by a snake.
Many scholars point out that the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades 
is breaking the rules of the roles within the traditional erastes/eromenos (older lover 
and younger beloved) relationships of ancient Greece.111 In the homosexual custom of 
ancient Greece the older lover, who desired the young and beautiful boy, offered him 
his “friendship, advice, assistance”, and in exchange could touch him affectionately, 
could satisfy his desires with him, though penetrative intercourse was forbidden. The 
younger beloved took these approaches passively, he even had to take care “not to 
allow the arousal of his own desire.”112 Alcibiades claims in his speech that he 
behaved as if he was the erastes and Socrates the young boy. He tells the others how 
he invited Socrates to dinner, “like a lover [erastes] scheming to ensnare his favourite” 
(217D). The reason for changing the roles can be twofold: it can reflect both 
Alcibiades’ understanding of eros and Socrates’ promotion of freedom. The freedom 
Socrates encourages is also embedded in the views he, himself, presents about eros.
What Alcibiades wants is an exchange. He wants Socrates’ wisdom, a beauty 
he has already glimpsed in Socrates, in return for his own bodily beauty. But he is 
possessed by what Socrates has. He wants to ascend Diotima’s path through the body.
110 Martha Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” 185.
111 Gary Alan Scott and William A. Welton, “An Overlooked Motive in Alcibiades’ Symposium Speech” 
Interpretation 24 (1996): 67-84, 14-15; Nussbaum, “The speech of Alcibiades,” 188. On the institution 
of pederasty in classical Athens, see K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1978) and Michel Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality, Vol. Two: The Use o f  
Pleasure (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).
1,2 Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” 188.
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But the two kinds of love we face here are two kinds of knowledge, two ways of 
cognition, which are, to borrow Nussbaum’s phrasing, “mutually exclusive varieties of 
vision.”113 She claims that to go one way, one has to give up the other. As we saw it 
earlier, Nussbaum points out that to follow Diotima’s teaching one has to leave behind 
the particular, the personal and ascend with and through eros to Beauty. This means 
that, for Alcibiades, the object of desire should not be Socrates, but his desire towards 
Socrates should be an intermediary towards absolute Beauty. If one chooses the other 
way, love for the particular person, reason will evaporate and the lover will get lost on 
the way to Beauty or Good. Nussbaum argues that whichever way one chooses, s/he 
has to sacrifice either a beauty or Beauty. She argues that following Diotima’s 
teaching, Socrates is unable to love a particular person, in this case, Alcibiades.114
Gary Alan Scott and William A. Welton raise objections to this claim in their 
article “An Overlooked Motive in Alcibiades’ Symposium Speech.”115 They argue that 
Socrates does not reject Alcibiades because of being unable to love one particular 
person, but because Alcibiades’ understanding of eros. Alcibiades’ eros does not leave 
space for freedom. He is thinking in terms of domination and subjugation when talking 
about love. Alcibiades’ eros “desires to assimilate or possess its object.”116 Scott and 
Welton claim, on the basis of Thucydides’ History, that this “imperialistic quality” of 
Alcibiades’ eros comes from Alcibiades’ character. Alcibiades tells his audience about 
an “Eros in which desire to possess the good, ignorant of the true good and its
113 Ibid, 198.
114 Vlastos, on the contrary, argues that Socrates does love Alcibiades and the young Athenians around 
him, but he does so in accordance with his own eros-concept: “their physical beauty gives special relish 
to his affectionate encounters with their mind. So there is no pretence and no deceit in saying to others 
that he is Alcibiades’ lover.” See: Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” in Socrates: Ironist and Moral 
Philosopher (Cambridge -  New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1991.), 21-44, 41.
115 Scott and Welton, 67-68.
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principle of limit, takes the form of an unlimited, insatiable desire to possess.”117 
Thucydides observes that this “daring ambition” carries in itself its own destruction. 
This “imperialistic quality” stands for both Athens and Alcibiades. The view of eros 
that Plato gives into the mouth of Alcibiades this way becomes a diagnosis of the 
decay of Athenian democracy and of the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian war.
As opposed to Alcibiades’ eros, Socratic eros is not possessive, or not 
“acquisitive,” as Scott and Welton perceive it.118 They claim that Nussbaum is 
mistaken to think that Socrates cannot love a particular person; the possibility of that is 
never denied in Diotima’s speech. It is simply the type of love that Alcibiades 
proposes to Socrates that is unacceptable for him. The argument goes that Socrates 
does not only promote freedom, but he also gives the possibility and the directions to 
his companions to free themselves. He wants to keep out of economic exchanges, that 
is why he does not accept money for teaching, this way talking only to those whom he 
wants to, and that is why he does not take the role of erastes either.
His kind of eros consists solely in neither lack nor possession, maintaining 
itself in the middle ground between lack (simple ignorance), on the one hand, 
and full possession or attainment of the desired good (knowledge) on the 
other.119
By keeping its daimonic position between ignorance and knowledge, eros gains its 
own dynamics. Eros, generating its own power, provides perpetual desire for further 
knowledge. This means that loving Socratically is a creative act, or in Iser’s term, an 
act of worldmaking. Not only eros is “the best helper that our human nature can hope
116 Ibid, 71.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid, 77.
75
to find” (212B) in the quest for absolute Beauty, but there is no absolute Beauty 
without eros\ no knowledge without hermeneutic desire.
Socrates, whom I already pointed out to be an eras-figure himself, is shown by 
Alcibiades to keep the intermediary, or daimonic feature of Diotima’s eros. 
Alcibiades’ love story is replete with the characteristics that Nussbaum points out to be 
absent from the contemplative ascent: compassion, reciprocity, and individuality. The 
speech serves as a counterpoint to Diotima’s speech and, as I stated earlier, also shows 
the Dionysiac side of Diotima’s eros. I argue that Socrates fuses two kinds of love by 
using the daimonic characteristic of eros, this way actually melding the two ways of 
cognition. The symbolic level of the dialogue also confirms this through the figure of 
Dionysus.
3.2.2 The Apollonian and the Dionysiac
As Nussbaum points out, Alcibiades is represented bearing the markers of 
mythological characters who are either female or have strong connections to the 
feminine. The flute girl helps him and “some others of his people” (212E) enter the 
room. He stands in the door “crowned with a bushy wreath of ivy and violets” (212E). 
Violets are the flowers of Aphrodite, the female divinity of love. Besides Aphrodite, 
violets are the markers of the Muses. It is interesting to see how Alcibiades tells the 
others the story of how he failed to be the Muse of Socrates. The third thing the violet 
is the symbol of, is Athens. As already mentioned, this is one of the reasons why we
119 Ibid, 72.
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should take into account Alcibiades’ political career and the fall of Athenian 
democracy when interpreting his speech.120
The other component of Alcibiades’ wreath besides violets is ivy. Ivy is the 
marker of Dionysus. Dionysus is the god of the earth’s fertility, vegetation, wine, 
sensuality, ecstasy, and also of drama (both comedy and tragedy).121 Being close to 
earth, which is a female principle in Greek mythology, Dionysus is related to 
femininity. He is also transgendered and bisexual.122 Nietzsche, in The Birth o f 
Tragedy, argues that Dionysus represents a way of cognition that is connected to 
sensuality and to the state of being possessed. Nietzsche differentiates between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysiac way of understanding the world, and between 
Apollonian and Dionysiac art.
Apollo is the god of light and harmony, but also the deity of oracle. He rules 
over the illusion of “our inner fantasy-world.”123 One of his most significant 
characteristics is sophrosune". wisdom tempered with moderation, avoiding excessive 
passions. Sophrosune is one of the most important characteristics Alcibiades attributes 
to Socrates. On the contrary, Dionysus’ cult is sensual, ecstatic, where the instincts are 
let loose. The followers of Dionysus relive the god’s passion in the state of mania, a 
possessed state of mind, while getting close to nature. Alcibiades, a Dionysiac figure 
himself, is in a state of mania when he is in the company of Socrates. One possible
120 Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” 185.
121 Pierre Brunei (ed.), Companion to Literary Myths, Heroes, and Archetypes, translated by W. 
Allatson, J. Hayward, and T. Selous, (London - New York: Routledge, 1996), entry: Dionysus.
122 He was raised dressed as a girl; also he had many male lovers. See: R. P. Conner, D. H. Sparks, and 
M. Sparks (eds), CasseTs Encyclopedia o f Queer Myth, Symbol, and Spirit (London: Cassel, 1997), 
entry: Dionysus.
123 Friedrich Nietzsche, A Tragedia Sziiletese (The Birth of Tragedy), translated by Imre Kertesz 
(Budapest: Europa Konyvkiado, 1986), 27.
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interpretation of Alcibiades’ understanding of eros is that he tries to apprehend the 
world through the Dionysiac way.
Nietzsche argues that the two poles, the Apollonian and the Dionysiac can be 
traced throughout the history of Greek culture and the meeting point of the two 
principles is tragedy. The Apollonian manifests in the dialogue of the drama, while the 
Dionysiac in the music and in the dance of the chorus. Alcibiades appears to be a 
Dionysiac figure in the Symposium. Besides wearing the wreath of ivy, he takes the 
role of the wine king (213E), who represented Dionysus during symposiums. 
However, Socrates is not his Apollonian counterpart. He does not appear in 
Alcibiades’ speech as a purely Apollonian figure. The power of Socrates’ speeches is 
compared to music, a typically Dionysiac phenomenon.
Alcibiades starts his speech by stating that he will praise Socrates “by 
similitudes” (215A). He uses basically three similes: (1) Socrates “is likest to the 
Silenus-figures that sit in the statuaries’ shops”; (2) “he resembles the satyr Marsyas” 
(215B); and (3) his speeches have the strength and the effect of the Sirens’ music. The 
Silenus-figures Alcibiades is talking about are statuettes made of wood. From the 
outside they are not really remarkable, but they can be opened in the middle, revealing 
an elaborately carved god statue. Silenus was the guardian and the teacher of 
Dionysus, just as Socrates was the teacher of Alcibiades.
Alcibiades’ second simile compares Socrates to Marsyas. Marsyas was a satyr 
who happened to find the pipe of Athene, which he played so exquisitely that his 
audience claimed he was more skilled with it than Apollo was with his lute. When 
Apollo heard this, he ordered Marsyas to enter into competition with him. After
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winning the contest Apollo skinned him alive.124 Oscar Wilde, in De Profundis, comes 
up with a similar idea to that of Nietzsche about two kinds of art. He argues that 
Apollo, with his cruel deed against Marsyas, deleted the natural from art. In his theory, 
it is Marsyas who stands in opposition with Apollo, representing the instinctual and 
natural in art.125 Standing in opposition to Apollonian art and being closely related to 
music, the Dionysiac domain, I argue that it is legitimate to interpret Marsyas as a 
Dionysiac epithet.
The third simile compares the power of Socrates’ speeches to those of the 
music of the Sirens. The music of the Sirens is an irresistible and deadly force. Anyone 
who hears is unable to resist it and gets enchanted by it. S/he will want to sail closer to 
their island only to have her/his ship get destroyed by the surrounding reefs -  yet 
another way of losing one’s rationality in connection to music.
All three similes Alcibiades uses are related to Dionysus, music or to Dionysus 
through music. I would say that the role of Alcibiades’ speech is not to counterpoint 
Diotima’s speech, but to show that Socrates follows Diotima’s teaching in a way that 
includes both the abstract and the concrete, both the general and the particular, as well 
as the spiritual and the material. His conceptualizing of eros is rooted precisely in 
taking apart these binaries through mediating between them. Calling these two ways 
Apollonian and Dionysiac is one possible analogy. Calling them male and female is 
another. Arlene Saxonhouse argues that Socrates has a hermaphroditic character. 
Hermaphrodite, that is androgyn, i.e. someone taking apart the binary opposition of
124 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Vol. /(New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1957), 77.
125 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis (London: Methuen, 1945), 127.
126 Arlene Saxonhouse, “Eros and the Female in Greek Political Thought: An Interpretation of Plato’s 
Sym posium Political Theory 12 (1984): 5-17,13.
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male and female. We need Alcibiades’ speech to understand Socrates’ androgynous 
character traits. Socrates breaks with dichotomies, the same way as eros does.
As I already pointed out earlier in this chapter, Diotima’s teaching has a cyclic 
structure. This can also be detected on the level of the circle of the speeches delivered 
at the dinner party, which start from bodily love (Phaedrus) and end up in abstract love 
(Diotima) and then again bring back the bodily element (Alcibiades). This cyclic 
organization can also be shown with regard to the presence of the female, both the 
woman and the feminine. The flute girl is sent away at the beginning and only returns 
with Alcibiades. Furthermore while the feminine is neglected by the first three 
speakers, it, at least, gets taken into consideration by Aristophanes, and then acquires 
real significance in the speeches of Socrates/Diotima and Alcibiades.
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Chapter 4
4.1 Diotima speaks through the body
Susan Hawthorne in her “Diotima Speaks through the Body” observes that Diotima’s 
speech does not only differ from Plato’s teaching in its content, but also in its structure 
and in its use of language. Diotima uses metaphors, which relate to female experience. 
These experiences are becoming, pregnancy, giving birth, and nurturing. Another 
metaphor is death, but according to the logic of the speech, “death and birth are the 
two transformative processes that ensure the continuity of life”127 and also the cyclical 
structure of the speech.
Hawthorne observes that the metaphors used in the speech are integrated in a 
way that the whole speech gains the form of a series of cycles. This form makes the 
speech work as a continuum, thus doing away with binary oppositions, both through its 
content and structure. Hawthorne uses the same argumentation to show how Diotima 
breaks with Socrates’ dialectic method. As to the structure, Hawthorne points out that 
Diotima returns to the same questions many times, always from a different level. 
These levels are identical to those outlined by Nussbaum. By the time the third circle 
is completed, Diotima’s teaching becomes a unity, in which eros is the metaxu, the 
‘between,’ building the three circles of the speech up to one unity, the cycle of 
Diotima’s teaching.
127 Hawthorne, 88.
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Based on her teaching, Hawthorne regards Diotima as “the earliest named
128woman philosopher to ‘think through the body’, or to ‘write through the body.’” She 
considers Diotima’s speech to be an early instance of ecriture feminine. It is interesting 
that Hawthorne closes her article with a quotation from Luce Irigaray’s “Sorcerer 
Love,” but while Irigaray claims that Diotima’s speech fails to be ecriture feminine, 
Hawthorne quotes Irigaray’s work to prove exactly the opposite. This is, however, 
only seemingly paradoxical because Hawthorne’s article concentrates on the texture of 
the speech, using Irigaray’s philosophical considerations of sexual difference, while 
according to Irigaray the speech fails to be an instance of ecriture feminine on the 
philosophical grounds of sexual difference. It is exactly the notion of sexual difference 
that the interpretations of the previous chapter, as well as Nye’s article failed to 
problematize.
As we have seen, the feminine is present in the speech, but there is the 
important question: how? Even if we interpret Diotima’s speech as an instance of
190ecriture feminine, which, as Helen Cixous points out in “The Laugh of the Medusa,” 
can be the text of a male writer; even if we prove that the speech connects two ways of 
seeing, understanding or creating the world, we have not yet problematized the notion 
of femininity that appears through the text.
The interpretation on the level that my investigations have reached up to now, 
does not question whether Diotima is a woman. Well, her gender is -  linguistically at 
least. However, we have to see that (s)he is an image created by a male author (Plato), 
based on a clearly male point of view. If we consider this, we will understand that
128 Ibid, 91. The quoted terms come from Adrienne Rich and Luce Irigaray.
129 Helene Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” translated by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs, Vol. 
1, No. 4 (Summer, 1976): 875-893, 878, footnote 3.
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where we arrived with our investigations above is not our destination, but the point of 
departure. This point is a position that enables us to begin unraveling the implications 
the text carries by Diotima’s seemingly being a woman. As David Halperin points out 
in his thorough investigation,130 one has to explore the text through the philosophy of 
sexual difference in order to give a positive answer to this question. It seems that 
unless doing so, we fall into the trap which most interpretations cannot avoid; 
explaining Diotima’s being a woman through her not being a man, i.e. through actually 
silencing her -  as we saw in the examples of Taylor, Raven and Guthrie.
4.2 Sexual difference
Sexual difference is not easy to bring to light -  it is difficult to find the woman in 
Diotima’s speech. What is more, it is hard to find a woman in Plato’s Athens, where -  
as Thomas Laqueur’s one-sex model illuminates it -  one sex was rendered to the two 
genders, male and female. Laqueur shows through texts by Galen, Aristotle and 
Hippocrates, among others, that women were imagined as men -  only inverted (the 
male genitalia turned in) and less perfect. The specifically female organs and their 
reproductive function were erased, giving the obliteration of sexual difference, which 
already was at work within the symbolic order, a scientific underpinning. According to 
this model, sexuality can be schematized on an imaginary axis, on top of which there is 
man, below him comes woman with less biological capacities (not producing sperm), 
and even lower there are other living creatures, animals and plants. My addition to this
130 David Halperin, “Why is Diotima a Woman?,” in One Hundred Years o f Homosexuality (New York : 
Routledge, 1990), 113-151,117.
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model is that between woman and animals there probably were slaves, but their sex did 
not matter (the Greeks called them podia (feet), which was used in the neuter gender).
However, based on the contradictory descriptions of anatomical findings and 
on the conclusions drawn from them, Laqueur assumes that anatomy was only another 
representation of the higher truth: woman is an inferior, impotent version of man, both 
politically and biologically:
In a public world that was overwhelmingly male, the one-sex model displayed 
what was already evident in culture more generally: man is the measure of all 
things, and woman does not exist as an ontologically distinct category.131
Halperin claims that the two most commonsense answers that are given to the query
‘why is Diotima a woman?’ are that (1) Plato, because of his own views upon
pederasty (and probably also because of contemporary Athen’s view on it), does not
want to draw a Socrates figure who learns through pederasty, and, in connection with
this, (2) Diotima, not being a man, has no personal involvement in male-to-male love
relations. As she is not directly influenced by these affairs, she stands above such
1bodily issues in a transcendent position, in “true mastery.”
Both answers are supportable but they are, on the one hand, blind to the notion 
of sexual difference and, on the other hand, do not problematize Diotima’s being a 
woman -  they only deal with her not being a man. Only with an understanding of 
sexual difference can we realize that we cannot even pose the question ‘why is 
Diotima a woman?’ -  as without that understanding we cannot see that she is not a 
woman, but a male construct of a female image, as intelligible to males through and
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within a male symbolic order, in which the female is understood as the lack of male, 
i.e. the lack of the phallus.
Why is Diotima not a woman, then? As it has been pointed out by several 
scholars,133 all the speakers in the Symposium project their own characteristics on the 
eros they praise, while actually ending up in delivering a eulogy of themselves rather 
than of eros. Socrates-Diotima practically does the same, as we saw in Chapter Three 
when I pointed out the parallels between eros, Socrates and Diotima -  which also 
emphasize both Socrates’ and eros’ being connected to the female. One can only but 
notice the metaphors of female experience while reading Diotima’s speech. The 
overwhelming abundance of these metaphors makes it clear that the speech wants to be 
read as a woman’s speech. It is emphasized all through the text that Diotima’s eros 
comes from a feminine perspective. However, there are telling signs which show that it 
is not a feminine standpoint from which Diotima speaks to us. It is quite likely that her 
point of view is that of the image of the woman as created and understood by men.
Halperin provides an in-depth analysis of this issue. He points out that there are 
two stereotypical presuppositions about women, which were popular and common in 
Plato’s Athens and from which Plato clearly deviates when constructing the speech in 
order to underpin his philosophical doctrine, which in many respects has feminine 
features. Examining these stereotypes may bring us closer to the question of sexual 
(in)difference within Athenian society as well as to some implications of Plato’s use of 
Diotima’s figure.
131 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body, Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 62.
132 Halperin, 116.
133 Charles Salman, “The Wisdom of Plato’s Aristophanes,” Interpretation 18 (1991): 233-250, see: 
234-36. Also, see: Halperin, 117.
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According to the first stereotype, once initiated into the erotic realms, women 
are unable to control their desires and also become insatiable. As we noted earlier 
about the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, no reciprocity was included 
within the traditional male-to-male erastes/eromenos relationships of ancient Greece. 
The young beloved passively let the older lover satisfy his desires on him, while not 
letting his own desire be aroused. No reciprocity was included in the sexual 
intercourse, which, this way, working only in one direction, cannot even be called that. 
In contrast, women were considered and allowed (or rather expected?) to take pleasure 
in their passive role, which the future leaders of the society, the young beloved males, 
were not expected to do. Thus, only women were supposed to show reciprocity in their 
sexuality -  and were, of course, also labeled ‘insatiable’ because of it. In light of this, 
the counter-love that is awoken in the young partner breaks the rules of the accepted or 
tolerated idea of pederasty.134 In Diotima’s teaching, both partners are active, the 
relationship is reciprocal -  something not allowed in traditional male-to-male relations. 
Halperin claims that this reciprocity is actually one of the cornerstones of Platonic 
philosophical discourse, the Platonic dialogue:
Erotic reciprocity animates what Plato considers the best sort of conversations, 
those in which each interlocutor is motivated to search within himself and to 
say what he truly believes in the confidence that it will not be misunderstood; 
mutual desire makes possible the ungrudging exchange of questions and 
answers which constitutes the soul of philosophical practice. Reciprocity finds
I O Cits ultimate expression m dialogue.
134 Halperin, 132. Also, see: Chapter Three above.
135 Ibid, 133.
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Plato thus makes use of the stereotypically feminine characteristic of mutuality in his 
teaching of eros (the motor of dialogue). However, this leads us to the second 
stereotypically feminine erotic trait Platonic teaching incorporates: eros aims towards 
generation, in Diotima’s words, towards “birth in beauty both by means of body and 
soul” (tokos en kalo kai kata to soma kai kata te psykhen 206B).
In ancient Athens, male sexual desire was conventionally looked upon as 
hunger, desire for possession, acquisition (this is still detectable in the contemporary 
cultural texture). This way, Alcibiades’ acquisitive eros represents a stereotypically 
possessive male or masculine sexual desire. Female sexuality, on the contrary, was
• • ,  1 fi f kconnected to procreation, just as Platonic eros is. Plato introduces the motive of a 
characteristically female experience through Diotima’s erotic teaching when she 
introduces the eros as aiming at procreation instead of possession. Halperin points out 
that it is an interesting double twist in Plato’s use of the female experience: while it is 
women’s sexuality that was conventionally considered as purely functional, i.e. aiming 
at procreation, it is actually males for whom sexual and procreative function cannot be 
separated, i.e. pleasure and begetting are inseparable. Halperin’s observation 
corresponds to Laqueur’s point on how biological facts failed to contribute to 
formulate knowledge, but rather were used to underlie ‘higher’ truths about the sexes. 
In the Symposium, first, we have ‘woman’ as an ideologically loaded imaginary 
creation, as created by and comprehensible to men, then we have that image, 
femininity, appropriated by Plato to achieve his philosophical aims.137
136 “birth in beauty both by means of body and soul” {Symposium, 206B).
137 Halperin, 142.
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4.3 Snatch
Cavarero’s work on Plato goes to the roots of the patriarchal symbolic order to 
investigate the workings of the appropriation of femininity and of maternal power. Her 
work is based on Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference. In her book, Cavarero sets 
out to delineate a female symbolic order through the re-appropriation of four female 
figures from and against the Platonic corpus. These are Penelope, Demeter, a 
maidservant from Thrace and Diotima, who are taken up as representatives of a female 
subjectivity with the capability of shaping an own, female symbolic order. Their re- 
appropriation is necessary in order to free the female subject from its position as being 
the other within the patriarchal symbolic order, in which female representation and/or 
the representation of the female is possible only through the male subject that is 
positioned in the center of signification. Within this male-centered signifying process, 
even female figures gain their meaning through, and only through, the symbolic codes 
constructed by patriarchy.
Cavarero carries out her dismantling of the workings of the patriarchal 
symbolic order through the re-appropriation of female mythic figures that appear 
within it. One of her presuppositions is that though Western culture is abundant in 
female mythic figures, these figures, as well as the symbolic order through which they 
emerge, are unable to express sexual difference. The reason for Cavarero’s choice of 
mythic figures in her attempt to unfold the patriarchal symbolic order and to start 
weaving a female representational system lies in the mythic figure’s capacity to 
“express in a concentrated way the symbolic order that shapes it,” to activate “a sense 
of self-recognition” and to conform to the development of the symbolic order in which
it appears, thus opening space for the appearance of different perspectives towards 
themselves over time.138
The patriarchal symbolic order takes for granted that the male subject is a 
universal subject, while the female subject can only recognize herself “in the 
imaginary of the other, already as a reconfigured essential figure of otherness.”139 
Within this essentializing process, sexual difference -  or even being sexed -  does not 
matter: the female subject can be accessed exclusively through the representations of 
“figures of hyper-masculine men” and through “figures of women constructed by 
men.”140 It is the latter that Cavarero sets out to grasp and steal from their context, and 
weave them into a feminine symbolic order, which is not based on the power of the 
phallus, recognizes our sexednQSS and enables the interplay of multiple perspectives, 
out of which a new, feminine perspective becomes emphasized.
The technique Cavarero uses to sketch this symbolic order is to ‘snatch’ these 
four mythic figures from their Platonic (contexts and from the symbolic order that is 
based on the matricidal shift from the culture of the Great Mother to the patriarchal 
symbolic order -  as Cavarero interprets the process of replacing mythos by logos and 
the expropriation and containment of maternal power within the patriarchal order. 
These mythic figures, then, with a radical change in perspective, are relocated and 
reactivated in their new context as the mythic figures of a feminine symbolic order.
Cavarero’s hermeneutical project, or “enterprise of theft” -  as she calls it,141 is 
to explore how the patriarchal symbolic order is based on, and constructed through, the
138 Adriana Cavarero, In Spite o f Plato, translated by Serena Anderlini D ’Onofrio and Anie O’Healy, 
(Cambridge-Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 2.
139 Ibid, 3.
original act of symbolic matricide. She considers the “classical moment” a relevant 
point of departure, as it is still a transitional phase, where the traces and memories of 
the representational shift, later lost to “patriarchal domination,” are still recognizable. 
The Platonic text provides especially suitable ground for snatching mythic figures, as 
“it is in Plato that the founding rite of matricide achieves its philosophical completion, 
even though not yet hardened into a systematic form.”142 The operation’s two axes are 
the philosophy of sexual difference and Hannah Arendt’s category of natality. 
Cavarero makes birth the central concept of her work, as the locus of female power. 
This is a breakup with patriarchal Western thought, which has, from its beginnings, 
traditionally measured life by death and directed itself towards death, through 
separating the soul from the body. It is in opposition to this tradition that Arendt 
introduces the notion of natality, which can actually be regarded as the rehabilitation of 
birth.
Western metaphysics, as pointed out by Arendt in The Human Condition,143 is 
based on the separation of the soul (the thinking part of the human being) from the 
body and the capacity for reaching the eternal realm of ideas through pure thinking. To 
achieve this pure thinking, the soul needs to untie itself from the body and its 
temporality. This is a death-like state, as the complete disconnection of soul and body 
occurs in death. This aspect of philosophy as ‘living for death’ can be shown all 
though the history of Western thought. On the other hand, this perspective results in 
the differentiation of two lives, the eternal and ‘true’ life of the soul and the finite, 
‘mere’ life of the body. Human beings live both of these lives at the same time while
142 Ibid.
143 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 178.
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being in the state between birth and death. This, however, makes birth a negative 
event: the soul’s imprisonment into the body. Birth, this way, gets interpreted as a 
descent, a fall.
Arendt breaks with this way of thinking and formulates the notion of natality, 
through which birth is conceptualized as the capacity for new beginning, new 
possibility and the ability to act. “[T]he new beginning inherent in birth can make itself 
felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning 
something anew, that is, of acting.” Every new arrival has the possibility to “perform 
what is infinitely improbable”; from each newcomer “the unexpected can be 
expected.”144 Cavarero, who also gives birth a central role in her thinking, makes an 
attempt to interweave those two lives separated by male thinking. She sketches a 
symbolic framework that enables human individuals to live and think within their life 
positioned between birth and death, in their (sexed) bodies, in their wholeness.
4.4 Diotima’s speech -  revisited
The following problem areas can be delineated in the light of Cavarero’s theoretical 
framework and Halperin’s investigations when analyzing Diotima’s figure and speech: 
(1) mimetic male desire for female experience, (2) immortality and (3) the emblematic 
figure of the birth giving-male. As we saw, finding access to these problems is in itself 
problematic, as they only penetrate the analyst’s radar if the pulses sent out onto the 
text are sensitive to sexual difference and are freed from ideologically loaded 
preconceptions.
144 Ibid.
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4.4.1 Mimesis
As we have seen, Diotima’s speech exuberates in metaphors related to the female 
experiences of becoming, pregnancy, giving birth, and nurturing. Plato clearly wants it 
to be noticed that the teaching is from a female point of view. We already investigated 
the hermaphrodite figure of Socrates and his mastery of the maieutic method. The 
feminine is an important part of Plato’s erotic teaching and it is essential that it is 
Socrates who first receives and then delivers Diotima’s doctrines. It is his reported 
speech that is important at this stage of our investigations, as the female voice and the 
Platonic teaching becomes tactically mixed in it. Cavarero emphasizes how “the device 
of reported speech creates the mimetic effect of confusing or commingling the male 
and female voice.”145 Socrates’ speech contains Diotima’s teaching the same way the 
Silenus-figures hold the statue of a god.
The “commingling” of male and female voices works in two directions: instead 
of hearing Socrates speaking about eros, we are made to think we hear a woman 
speaking, and vice versa, while we think we hear a woman speaking, we actually hear 
Plato’s ideas. The mimesis of the female experience becomes a flux, happening on 
many levels in two directions, becoming “a subtle and ambiguous strategy requiring 
that a female voice expound the philosophical discourse of a patriarchal order that 
excludes women, ultimately reinforcing the original matricide that disinvests them.”146 
This is achieved through the exquisite construction of the texture of the speech,
Cavarero, 93.
146 Ibid, 94.
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through the mimesis of female experience. This texture gets woven with such subtlety 
that it has even passed for an instance of ecriture feminine.
The double twist in the speech is that while women’s maternal power is being 
mimed, love is separated from procreation, which, in turn, is reduced to sexual 
reproduction. Although giving birth serves as the framework of male-to-male love, this 
refers only to giving birth by means of the soul. Giving birth through the body, i.e. 
through heterosexual love, gets debased, it becomes the terrain of women. While being 
the basis for the erotic ascent through eros, birth becomes the key metaphor of 
women’s ties to their bodily existence.
As we saw earlier, eros aims at “birth in beauty both by means of body and 
soul.”147 I consider this line to be the key to unveiling the workings of Plato’s 
technique of expropriating maternal power for use in his own philosophy. All the 
expropriating mechanisms at work within the speech are condensed along this line, 
which serves as the key point from which our analysis can unfold.
The expropriation of maternal power, the exclusion of women from the 
philosophical discourse and the separation of body and soul, i.e. the inauguration of 
the two lives of body and soul are all proposed here. The life of the soul is what the 
philosopher cherishes and it is achieved through male-to-male love. The cradle of this 
doctrine is the dinner party at Agathon’s household; the teaching itself is to live on for 
millennia and become further purified by Christianity.
Cavarero points out that “the distinction between body and soul will enable 
philosophy to be defined as a birthing of the male soul and is linked to love between
147 Plato uses here the technical term ‘tokos,’ which means birth, but was often translated as ‘engender’ 
and ‘beget’, producing a male-centered interpretation.
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men.”148 This birthing takes place out of the body and is directed towards the eternal, 
aiming at “the good to be one’s own for ever” (206A). The goal of giving birth in 
beauty through the soul is to reach the realm of immortality and to possess beauty, the 
good (agathos), forever. It is through this type of birth that the soul can untie itself 
from its temporality in the body and reach the realm of eternal ideas, of immortality -  
our following topic.
4.4.2 Immortality
The immortality in which human beings can take part is necessarily symbolic. We may 
achieve union with absolute Beauty, which is eternal, never changing. However, only 
the immortality of the human race can be achieved, as all human beings have to die, 
and they cannot get out of this circle.
The erotic route towards symbolic immortality leads through eros, i.e. through 
giving birth in beauty: in body, by heterosexual lovers -  providing the immortality of 
the species; and in soul, through male-to-male love. However, after Diotima’s teaching 
arrives at this point, the lovers immediately step forward, the bodies are left below, and 
only those pregnant in soul are heading towards the immortal through eros. The 
Arendtian view on Western thought seems immensely relevant here: the measure of 
the process is death, men aim towards immortality. They want to untie themselves 
from the body, from temporality, and reach the death-like-state of pure thinking. Man 
would even die to conquer death if he gained eternal fame through it. The Symposium
148 Cavarero, 98.
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is one of the earliest instances of the separation of the soul from the body -  a 
conceptualization, which later developed into our philosophical tradition.
Birth that results from heterosexual relation is degraded in Diotima’s teaching, 
but the mimers of maternal power also immediately claim themselves to be better in 
giving birth, than mothers are. The male philosopher uses the maternal experience as a 
stepping stone and, as soon as he has appropriated birth, he thinks himself to be better 
at giving birth than a female mother, whose experience and capacity was just an entry, 
but who is now connected to death, as her name will not live on eternally. Immortality 
is the prerequisite for the men engaged in giving birth to the children of the soul. As 
Cavarero points out, the womb envy of the male is turned against the bearers of the 
original power; the mothers are inflicted with penis envy. The original desire for 
maternal power, and maternal power as such, is eliminated. Simultaneously with this 
process the differentiation of two lives takes place: the eternal life of the soul, as the 
exclusive propriety of the male philosopher and the finite, ‘mere’ life of the body: the 
mothers’ allowance.
This corresponds to Cavarero’s point that Plato’s texts stand in a very 
interesting position within the process of the development of the matricidal, patriarchal 
symbolic order, as the traces of the transition are clearly visible in them:
The symbolic force of the repressed pole is taken up through a mimetic 
disguise, so that maternal power, having been tom away from its roots in the 
context of birth, cloaks the matricidal cultivators of death with its symbolic 
power; and in this way birth, as the original locus of maternal power, is 
ultimately negated.149
149 Ibid, 104.
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What opens up before us is the expropriation of maternal power, the consequent 
negation and debasement of birth, the advent of Western logocentrism and the 
celebration of the emblem of the birth-giving male. It is ironic that all this takes place 
with the guidance of a ‘female’ master.
Page duBois also emphasizes the important position of the Platonic oeuvre 
within the development of our phallogocentric philosophical tradition. She understands 
the Platonic text as the “threshold of a new description of sexual difference”150 and 
points out that the expropriation of maternal power via the systematic use of metaphors 
related to female experience, especially within the Theaetetus and the Symposium, 
“reinscribes the female by locating her powers within the male.” The Platonic 
expropriation, claims duBois, opens space for the subsequent “‘metonymizing’ of the 
female body,” through which the female is represented as an imperfect male and 
defined as lack.151
4.4.3 Male birth
The debasement of birth was a long process, which began well before Plato’s time. It 
is clearly detectable in the development of the stories within Greek mythology. The 
myth of the very first woman, Pandora, is a good example for showing the direction of 
change in positioning the female. The name ‘Pandora’ (all+gift) originally meant ‘all 
giving’ as the name referred to Rhea, the Earth-goddess. The form all+gift, however, 
can also be taken to mean ‘all gifts,’ and it is this position Hesiod takes in coming up
150 Page duBois, Sowing the Body. Psychoanalysis and Ancient Representations o f Women (Chicago -  
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 173.
151 Ibid, 174.
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with the Pandora myth in the form familiar to us today: The first woman, Pandora, was 
sent as an evil gift, as punishment by Zeus to mankind. She was created from clay by 
Hephaistus, was dressed with gifts from many gods. Athene dressed her, the Charites 
and Peitho provided her with jewelry, she received her beauty from Aphrodite and her 
deceitful nature from Hermes.152
Pandora herself as a ‘gift’ brings about mortality, sexuality, and all man’s ills 
to a mankind that had previously consisted only of males. She releases all bad things 
from ajar, which later got referred to as Pandora’s box.153 The jar is a symbolic womb, 
conceptualizing woman as a necessary evil to the survival of humankind. With the 
advancement of male domination in culture, birth gets a negative value, as it represents 
the weakest point of patriarchy: its reliance on mothers for procreation. The division of 
the body from the soul in Plato’s philosophical thought can be considered a further 
step in the attempt of men to culturally procreate themselves without relying on the 
murky mystery of women.
Let us stop the train of thought here to explain what I mean by writing “the 
murky mystery of women.” As already pointed out in chapter three, the female is 
generally connected to the earthly, the sensual in Greek thinking, which is often shown 
to work in a system of hierarchized binary oppositions. The female, who was 
positioned on the subordinate side of these oppositions, was generally connected to the 
bodily, to the dark and the bad. While I do not mean to create yet another set of 
essentializing stereotypes about the Greek mind, I find it useful to show Aristotle’s
152 H. J. Rose, A Handbook o f Classical Mythology, (London: Methuen, 1958), 55.
153 Graves, 145.
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diagram of the Pythagorean Table,154 which is his outline of the ten pairs of principles 
accepted by many Pythagorean thinkers:
Limit Unlimited
Odd Even
One Many
Right Left
Male Female
Resting Moving
Straight Curved
Light Darkness
Good Bad
Square Oblong
The table is a telling illustration of how the cultural representation of gender rendered 
a negative sign to the female. The negativization of femininity in patriarchy correlates 
with the desire for male asexual reproduction, with the birth-giving male as one of its 
emblems.
The notion of men giving birth to themselves has its mythological predecessors 
and Plato is not the first to invent the emblem of the birth-giving male either. Both 
Athena and Dionysus are bom from Zeus, through a mimetic appropriation of maternal 
power. It is Dionysus who I will focus on in the rest of this chapter. On the one hand,
154 As it appears in Sabina Lovibund’s essay “An Ancient Theory of Gender: Plato and the Pythagorean 
Table,” in Leonie J. Archer (ed.), Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion o f the Night (Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, 1994), 88-101, 89.
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the myth of his birth is an interesting melting pot of our problematized topics and, on 
the other hand, my thesis is that we can ‘snatch’ back Diotima’s speech through 
interpreting it in its relation to the Dionysiac.
4.4.4 Dionysus
My presupposition is that the Dionysiac side of Diotima’s teaching enables us to find a 
space for lifting Diotima’s speech out of its male symbolic surroundings into a realm 
that allows the female to interpret herself on her own terms -  where her difference is 
not contained within the male symbolic order. This means a kind of counter­
reappropriation, the route of which is marked by Cavarero.
Cavarero, as we will see, reads the myth of Dionysus through the maenads in 
order to show the maternal continuum, which connects the life of the individual to 
infinity. While I accept her interpretation of the Dionysus myth, my thesis is that 
through the notion of birth and through Alcibiades’ speech (which illuminates the 
Dionysiac side of Diotima’s teaching) we can open space for an interpretation of the 
speech that recognizes sexual difference within it. Cavarero does not recognize the 
direct link between Diotima’s speech and Dionysus that I showed in the previous 
chapter. She connects the two through the ambiguity in the representation of both the 
feminine and the masculine as self-sufficient entities in Greek mythology, in 
accordance with how they appear in Hesiod’s Theogonia. I propose a re-embedding of 
Diotima’s speech into its textual context, in order to re-appropriate it from its male- 
dominated symbolic context.
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As I pointed out earlier, the myth of Dionysus’ birth includes both the elements 
of matricide and male birth. Apollodorus’ version155 of the story goes as follows:
Zeus fell in love with Semele and slept with her, promising her anything she 
wanted, and keeping it all from Hera. But Semele was deceived by Hera into 
asking Zeus to come to her as he came to Hera during their courtship. So Zeus, 
unable to refuse, arrived in her bridal chamber on a chariot with lightning 
flashes and thunder, and sent a thunderbolt at her. Semele died of fright, and 
Zeus grabbed from the fire her six-month aborted baby, which he sewed into 
his thigh. [...] At the proper time Zeus loosened the stitches and gave birth to 
Dionysus, whom he entrusted to Hermes. (3.26-29)
Hermes takes the child to Ino and Athamas who are to raise him up as a girl. After 
Hera drives Nysa and Athamas into madness, Hermes confides the child to the nymphs 
of Nysa. Already as a child, Dionysus has a close connection with women, which 
becomes a characteristic of his cult. His followers, the maenads, are a daemonic group 
of women in a state of frenzy, of the divine madness, mania. Their mania and their 
closeness to wild animals are their main characteristics. The maenads’ frenzy often 
turns into violence as the mania releases repressed primal and instinctual energies.
Thus, the cult of Dionysus directs us towards the primal, towards animality, the 
connection to which is established through women. Dionysus’ cult strongly relies on 
the imagery of birth and motherhood. The maenads, who are often depicted as mothers 
abandoning their babies and suckling infant animals, lead us from cultured birth-giving 
to our primal origin. There even exists a story where bewildered women tear their 
children limb from limb and subsequently eat them -  an action that is typical of wild 
animals.156
155 Apollodorus, The Library, translated by Sir. J. G. Fraser, (London -  New York: Loeb Classical 
Library, 1921), 3.26-29.
156 Apollodorus, 2.37.
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Getting closer to our repressed primal instincts, to animality, is closely 
connected to the feminine within the cult. The way to access this side of the human 
psyche leads through mothers, through maternal power and its revelation in birth.
Dionysus’ cult on the one hand shows how the conventional hierarchy of god -  
man -  animal becomes, in practice, further divided into god -  man -  woman -  animal. 
However, the cult of Dionysus, as Cavarero rightly points out, also illustrates an 
important shift, bringing together ‘god’ and ‘animal.’ The animal element clearly 
comes to the surface as divine in the cult. The passage to this divine animal realm 
leads “through innumerable sequence of births from female bodies”, the process that 
Cavarero calls the “maternal continuum.”157
The maternal continuum, this “infinite chain of mothers”158 directs our 
attention to where we come from. Focusing on our origin, the notion of the maternal 
continuum breaks with the fixation on death in Western thought: birth becomes the 
entry towards an infinite continuum, linking the individual to an eternal, primal flow of 
life. In this flow of life, death and birth become “two transformative processes that 
ensure the continuity.”159 This statement that Hawthorne originally makes about 
Diotima’s speech (already quoted in the beginning of this chapter) opens up in its full 
significance with the recognition of maternal power and sexual difference.
Informed by the notion of sexual difference, we can interpret Diotima’s speech 
on a more complex level, keeping my presupposition that Diotima’s erotic teaching 
can be interpreted as the bridge between the Apollonian and the Dionysiac, where the 
pair ‘Apollonian and Dionysiac,’ besides the analogies outlined in Chapter Three, also
157Cavarero, 111.
158 Ibid, 118. Cavarero turns around the Lacanian notion of infinite chain o f signifiers.
159 Hawthorne, 88.
stand for ‘Western metaphysics vs. a new way of thinking.’ This new way of thinking 
is the route to human logos via the feminine, the route of “painless conciliation 
between individuality and infinite life,”160 i.e. life itself.
This is exactly the essence of Dionysus’ cult. The Greeks had two different 
words for life: bios and zoe, both of which, according to Kerenyi, developed from the 
same root. Zoe “‘resounds’ with the life of all living creatures” (zoon), referring to 
“life in general, without further characterization.” Bios, on the other hand, refers to a 
specific, a “characterized life,” marking “the outlines that distinguish one living thing 
from another” (hence the word ‘biography’).161 Kerenyi explains zoe as “the thread 
upon which every individual bios is strung like a bead, and which, in contrast to bios,
1 f f )  • •can be conceived of only as endless.” It follows from zoe’s lack of characterization 
or attributes, as Kerenyi points out, that it, “our simplest, most intimate and self- 
evident experience,” is indescribable.163 Through the cult of Dionysus, the Greeks had 
access to experiencing zoe, i.e. infinite life.
Our counter-reappropriation is symbolic. The symbol through which it is 
achieved is the body of a male god, Dionysus, tom limb from limb by the maenads. 
Iser points out that a “symbol looks in two directions at once, comprising regression 
and progression, and thereby revealing a buried past and an intended future.”164 This 
duality of direction makes the symbol “an epitome of double meaning that, owing to 
its indivisibility, allows the archaic to be read through the teleological and vice versa,”
160 Cavarero, 119.
161 Karl Kerenyi, Dionysos: Archetypal Image o f Indestructible Life (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1976), xxxii.
162 Ibid, xxxv.
163 Ibid, xxxvi.
164 Iser, 78.
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creating the meeting point of arche and telos.165 The concentric circles of the 
interpretation of Diotima’s eros are drawn in both of these directions: The guests of 
the Symposium are feasting on Diotima’s body, which serves as a host166 to the 
mimetic appropriation of maternal power and the founding of the philosophy of death. 
Through the maenads who tear apart Dionysus’ body (later in the form of the 
sacrificial bull and the goat), however, we may enter the territory of the Great Goddess 
and a philosophy of birth.
Women were the bearers of Dionysus’ cult in Athens. The sacred ceremonies 
of the Lenaion, the temple of Dionysus, and his fourteen altars throughout the city 
were performed by the Geraiai, a group of fourteen Athenian women and the queen
1 fn(later the archon's wife). Kerenyi argues that the Dionysian mysteries clearly have
their origin in Minoan Crete, in the cult of the Great Goddess. The key female figures
in the different variants of the myth of Dionysus -  namely Rhea and Persephone,
Semele and Ariadne -  are versions of each other, and, most significantly, of the Great 
1Goddess. The duality of their roles as mother and daughter emphasizes that it is 
always the same birth repeated in giving birth to their mystic child, Dionysus, who 
represents “the indestructibility of life in what was, in a manner of speaking, its lowest 
form:” zoe}69 Each conception of life stood for the bestowal of soul on this lowest
11C\form and thus, each birth meant the “genesis of souls” through the infinite chain of 
mothers.
165 Ibid.
166 Diotima as host is Nye’s metaphor. See: Nye, 197.
167 Kerenyi, 307-9.
168 Ibid, 114-6.
169 Ibid, 115.
170 Ibid, 125.
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I contend that Diotima’s speech connects the here and now to the possibility of 
a female symbolic order through its Dionysiac side as shown by Alcibiades. The entry 
to the realm of this interpretation is birth and the route to it leads through eros, which, 
in this case, gains an additional meaning of desire for our origin through birth. One 
has to make sure though to have made careful rounds around the speech, as we did in 
this thesis, before adding this new layer to the meanings of eros. Diotima’s eros first 
needs to be re-rooted in the soil of sexual difference and in the sexed body. This 
ensures that instead of reiterating the containment of the female by a male symbolic 
order, the speech is opened up and allowed to unfold for interpretation within a 
paradigm where self and other make no sense from a male-centric perspective; where 
the importance of the female and the significance of sexual difference are not 
overlooked.
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Conclusion
A gender-oriented interpretation of Diotima’s speech is, in its essence, an 
interdisciplinary enterprise. The multifaceted functions of Platonic dialogues and the 
various aspects of the speech make it impossible to clearly separate philosophy, 
classical philology, literature, and gender studies (in itself an interdisciplinary field 
within social and cultural studies) while carrying out such a project. This thesis 
pursued a gender-oriented textual investigation of Diotima’s speech with a 
philosophical perspective. The purpose of this erotic enterprise was to formulate my 
own interpretation, which is an intermediary between Irigaray’s and Nye’s analyses, 
and which also re-roots Diotima’s eros, ‘snatching’ it from its phallogocentric context 
and interpretations.
Subjectivity is always detectable in interpretation, in its choice of subject and 
in the direction the analysis takes through the interpreter’s conscious and unconscious 
selections. Nye, at one point, overtly criticizes Irigaray for projecting the problems of a 
“twentieth-century Parisian intellectuelle”171 onto Diotima. I do not think this 
projection to be a problem in itself, as long as the interpreter develops a self-awareness 
in order to be able to map the interplay of three realities: the fictional reality of the 
text, the social reality of the author (if I may use such an archaic term), and the social 
reality of the reader. In addition to these horizons, each re-actualization of a text 
includes the horizon of the analyst’s position within, and in relation to, the interpreting 
tradition, which also has to be taken into account.
171 Nye, 205.
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The original question that the Symposium posed to me, as it had done to many 
before me in the infinite chain of its interpreters -  why is Diotima a woman? -  has not 
been and cannot be fully answered. It can be clearly inferred from the investigations 
above that Plato uses the figure of Diotima for his philosophical purposes. My analysis 
showed that the techniques through which Plato achieves this aim include the male 
mimesis of birth, the separation of body and soul, and metonymizing the female body. 
It is precisely the unreconstructability of the authorial intention, however, which 
makes it impossible to give a definitive answer to the question above, while, at the 
same time, also providing Diotima’s speech with possible ways of getting out of the 
grip of that very authorial intention.
Unraveling the subtle workings of Socrates/Diotima’s speech showed how 
Diotima and her eros, as Plato’s creations, get contained in a phallogocentric network. 
However, a strategic switch from intention to meaning, as propagated by Gadamer, 
enables the reader to open up the speech for a successful re-rooting of eros. I consider 
Cavarero as well as Irigaray (whose article I will return to shortly) to have achieved 
this.
Gadamer asserts that the intention of the author cannot be understood, only the 
possible meanings of the text. So the ‘why’ of our original question does not refer to 
what Plato’s intention might have been, but rather to what the possible implications of 
Diotima’s being a woman are for the reader of her speech. This means that one should 
not look for an answer to why Diotima is a woman, but aim at understanding that 
question in order to pose more questions that may, in turn, lead to further 
understanding of the text, thus making the original question meaningful.
106
Gadamer emphasizes the priority of the question within the process of 
interpretation. Interpreting a text is understanding the question it poses to us in the 
complexity of its possibilities, thus making it indeterminate, open. The art of 
questioning lies in always questioning further. The point is in opening the original 
question itself for questionableness. Only the realization that Diotima is not a woman 
can enable the interpreter to open up the possibilities for her to be a woman -  and not a 
‘woman’: an effect of negation or a fantasy of the male subject.
The shift from intention to meaning in my analysis in an attempt to deconstruct 
Diotima’s ‘womanhood’ necessitated the recognition of sexual difference and also a 
shift of focus from linearity to circularity within the interpretative process. Let us 
evoke Iser’s theory of interpretation once more to highlight some important 
connections uncovered by the thesis. This will lead us, first, to Irigaray’s re-rooting of 
Diotima’s eros and then, finally, to my own.
Iser emphasizes recursive looping within interpretation. He applies the notion 
of recursive loop as a continual feedback mechanism that informs the register how to 
cope with the subject matter, based on past experience. Recursive loops are fed by the 
vortex created by the liminal space and their courses are shaped by the interplay of 
input and output of the interpretative process itself, bringing about a growing 
complexity of the register.
Interpretation conceptualized this way is poetic (poietic) in two ways: on the 
one hand, it makes the subject matter function, creating emergent phenomena (new 
territories), which are identical neither with the subject matter, nor with the register of 
interpretation; while on the other hand, it serves as the motor of, or desire for, further
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interpretation. The recursive loop is the reaction to the doubly poetic nature of 
interpretation.
Recursive looping answers the dual nature of interpretation by weaving 
together its linear and cyclical dimensions. The model comprises a series of circles 
forming a spiral on the linear temporality, that is, the axis of time. If time is imagined 
to flow horizontally in this model, the hierarchization of the consecutive cycles can be 
avoided. Each specific instance of interpretation will only be one (set of) input(s) 
within the ‘recursive history’ of the subject matter, increasing the complexity of its 
interpretation, but never excluding other interpretations. Iser’s model illustrates with 
its concentric circles following each other through time that while interpretation can be 
full it always remains open-ended. What is achieved is not only openness, and fluidity, 
but also the impossibility of closure.
The spiral that is drawn up by this model makes a suitable analogy to show 
how Diotima’s eros, which she calls the “friend of wisdom” (philosophos) (204B), is a 
hermeneutic eros aiming at beauty and knowledge. The model also provides the 
ground for the de-hierarchization of the levels of the contemplative ascent. We have 
seen the significance of circularity within the Symposium, in Diotima’s speech and also 
within the path to absolute Beauty. After each cycle of the path, the hermeneutic or 
erotic quest is re-fuelled with a new desire for understanding the unknown. Eros 
reaches beyond itself, creating new meanings, while evoking further poiesis: “Never 
completed, always evolving.”172 The same way as reality does not pre-exist 
interpretation in Iser’s model, Diotima’s absolute Beauty does not pre-exist desire. The
172 Irigaray, “Sorcerer Love,” 182.
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relationship between reality and knowledge becomes relativized: eros creates beauty -  
both in body and soul.
Looking back at Irigaray’s article in the light of our circular model shows how 
she achieves a successful re-rooting of eros in her analysis. Though we come to the 
same result through separate methods, she also re-roots eros in the body. Irigaray 
opens up the text not in its linearity, but in its circularity. This move enables any point 
of opening in the texture of the speech to serve as an entry through which eros may be 
re-rooted.
Although Irigaray claims that the second part of Diotima’s speech fails to keep 
eros’ intermediary character, she praises Diotima’s speech where its eros offers a 
medium-like fertility, the “immortal becoming of the living.”173 This immortality is not 
to be confused with the one separating the body and the soul, as shown to be 
characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. The aim of eros is immortality 
within mortality, between birth and death, embodied:
The aim of love is to realize the immortality in the mortality between lovers. 
Procreation and generation in beauty -  these are the aim of love, because it is 
thus that the eternity and imperishability of a mortal being manifest 
themselves.174
While she finds the second part of Diotima’s speech problematic, Irigaray realizes the 
subversive potential of Diotima’s eros when it bears its medium-like character. 
Diotima’s speech does not have to be subversive in its linearity: Irigaray’s way of 
reading does not work that way. The speech can be dismantled through its eros when it
173 Ibid, 187.
174 Ibid.
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is daimonic, carrying the potential of divinity, immortality within mortality, in every 
union between the lovers -  through generation in harmony.
This re-conceptualization of eros is in accord with my own interpretation: 
Establishing the relation between the Dionysiac and Diotima’s eros, or that of 
Alcibiades’ eros concept and the stereotypically constructed male and female ways of 
loving -  fuelled my analysis towards the notion of sexual difference, generating a 
series of recursive loops to re-visit Diotima’s speech. The notion of sexual difference 
is pivotal in recognizing how Diotima (a female image created by Plato) and her 
teaching become contained within Plato’s male-centric philosophical framework. First, 
we see the creation of a female image representing female power, then the subsequent 
appropriation of that power for Plato’s philosophical goals. I borrowed Cavarero’s 
technique of re-appropriation to elaborate an interpretation of Diotima (both her figure 
and teaching) and the notion of maternal power on their own grounds.
My analysis revealed how the mimetic male desire for female experience, the 
notion of immortality and the emblem of the birth-giving male become constituents of 
the expropriation of maternal power. This expropriation led to the later exclusion of 
women from philosophical discourse and to the separation of two lives, that of the 
body and that of the soul. I claimed that it is possible to ‘snatch’ back Diotima’s figure 
and teaching from the patriarchal symbolic order through the concept of birth 
(understood via the Arendtian notion of natality) with the help of the figure and cult of 
Dionysus. Based on the direct link previously established between Diotima’s speech 
and the Dionysiac, I provided an interpretation of Diotima’s eros as an intermediary 
between individuality and infinite life, as well as between body and soul; as the
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possibility of immortality within mortality; as a desire for our origin through birth. 
This was achieved through re-rooting eros in the body.
As for the other aim of the thesis, namely to mediate between Irigaray and Nye, 
I believe the goal has been achieved, at least in opening a dialogue between their 
methods. Following Iser’s model of interpretation enabled me to use a combined set of 
tools throughout my interpretation of Diotima’s speech, which took into consideration 
the achievements of post-structuralism, but also looked ‘around’ the work to see what 
possible socio-cultural (including historical) aspects played a part in the construction 
of the text. I already stated that I consider Irigaray’s article to be successful in re­
rooting eros. As for Nye, I accept several points of her interpretation of Diotima’s 
speech, but not her critique of Irigaray’s article, which I do not think she opens up for 
interpretation.
Interpretation is never complete and so my thesis marks several directions for 
subsequent analyses and further dialogues with Diotima’s speech. An in-depth 
exploration of the Apollonian and the Dionysiac within Diotima’s eros is one of these 
possible directions. Reading together Nietzsche’s The Birth o f Tragedy and the 
Symposium would reveal some aspects not yet problematized. Another direction 
emerges at the point where my investigations intersect with the broader issue of 
translation. A historical analysis of ‘translation as interpretation’ through the case 
study of Diotima’s speech would show how (if at all) certain gendered aspects of 
Diotima’s speech have been addressed by scholarship throughout the centuries and 
would also reveal important aspects of the interaction between ideology and 
scholarship. Also, it would be interesting to explore how the image of the womb, as an 
analogue for dialogical space, a differential, carries implications for a feminine
hermeneutics based on the hermeneutic eros outlined above. These are only examples 
of the several possible openings of the speech and, having pointed out these directions, 
I let the conversation go on.
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